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This	  is	  a	  pre-­‐print.	  The	  final	  version	  will	  appear	  in	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs.	  	  DOES	  “OUGHT”	  IMPLY	  “FEASIBLE?”*	  Nicholas	  Southwood	  	  I.	  INTRODUCTION	  Imagine	  a	  mercantile	  and	  materialistic	  polity,	  Pecunia,	  in	  which	  achieving	  a	  modest	  improvement	  in	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation	  is	  infeasible	  inasmuch	  as	  most	  members	  of	  the	  middle-­‐class	  majority	  simply	  cannot	  bring	  themselves	  to	  work	  at	  the	  requisite	  level	  of	  intensity	  for	  less	  pecuniary	  gain	  (cf	  Cohen	  2008,	  ch.	  1).	  Now	  consider	  the	  claim	  that	  	   (1) The	  Pecunians	  ought	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation.	  	  What	  should	  our	  reaction	  be	  to	  normative	  claims	  such	  as	  (1)	  that	  make	  infeasible	  demands?	  The	  reaction	  that	  many	  of	  us	  in	  fact	  have,	  I	  take	  it,	  is	  to	  feel	  deeply	  conflicted	  (see	  Nagel	  1991,	  ch.	  2).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  claims	  such	  as	  (1)	  seem	  to	  be	  evidently	  false	  in	  virtue	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible	  (Goodin	  and	  Pettit	  1995;	  Brennan	  and	  Southwood	  2007;	  Southwood	  and	  Wiens	  forthcoming;	  Gilabert	  2012;	  Gilabert	  and	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2012;	  Wiens	  2015).	  While	  it	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  imagine	  a	  world	  where	  members	  of	  the	  middle-­‐class	  were	  disposed	  to	  be	  less	  concerned	  with	  their	  own	  lot	  and	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  lot	  of	  the	  less	  fortunate,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  world	  we	  live	  in.	  In	  the	  world	  such	  as	  it	  is,	  where	  most	  members	  of	  the	  middle-­‐class	  cannot	  bring	  themselves	  to	  do	  what	  is	  required	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  situation	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation,	  it	  is	  simply	  false	  that	  the	  Pecunians	  ought	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  situation	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation.	  To	  insist	  otherwise	  would	  amount	  to	  objectionable	  unworldliness	  –	  to	  chasing	  “pies	  in	  the	  sky.”	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  claims	  such	  as	  (1)	  also	  seem	  to	  be	  evidently	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands	  (Estlund	  2011,	  pp.	  219-­‐21;	  Cohen	  2008;	  Gheaus	  2013).	  The	  case	  of	  the	  Pecunians	  seems	  to	  be	  aptly	  described	  as	  a	  case	  where	  objectionable	  character	  traits	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  For	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  article	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middle-­‐class	  majority	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  it	  is	  infeasible	  for	  the	  Pecunians	  to	  do	  what	  they	  plainly	  ought	  to	  do.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  Pecunians	  fail	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  situation	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation,	  we	  should	  say	  that	  they	  have	  done	  something	  wrong.	  To	  deny	  this	  would	  be	  to	  be	  guilty	  of	  treating	  the	  Pecunians	  with	  undue	  lenience	  –	  of	  mistakenly	  letting	  them	  “off	  the	  hook.”	  	  Not	  everyone	  will	  share	  my	  ambivalence.	  But	  suppose	  you	  do.	  What	  is	  going	  on?	  A	  natural	  response	  is	  that	  what	  is	  going	  on	  is	  that	  we	  are	  making	  a	  mistake.	  What	  I	  shall	  call	  the	  principle	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  (OF)	  holds	  that	  	   (OF)	   An	  agent	  or	  set	  of	  agents	  A	  ought	  to	  realize	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  x	  only	  if	  it	  is	  feasible	  for	  A	  to	  realize	  x	  (Brennan	  and	  Southwood	  2007;	  Southwood	  and	  Wiens	  forthcoming).	  	  (OF)	  is	  either	  true	  or	  false.	  Either	  it’s	  true,	  in	  which	  case	  our	  sense	  that	  (1)	  is	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible	  –	  and	  that	  denying	  the	  truth	  of	  (1)	  involves	  treating	  the	  Pecunians	  with	  undue	  lenience	  –	  involves	  a	  mistake.	  Or	  it’s	  false,	  in	  which	  case	  it	  is	  our	  sense	  that	  (1)	  is	  false	  on	  account	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible	  –	  and	  that	  insisting	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  (1)	  involves	  objectionable	  unworldliness	  –	  that	  involves	  a	  mistake.	  Either	  way,	  our	  ambivalence	  involves	  a	  mistake.	  The	  philosophical	  task	  is	  to	  say	  what	  the	  mistake	  is	  and	  why	  we	  are	  disposed	  to	  make	  it.1	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  article	  is	  to	  develop	  a	  different	  response.	  This	  begins	  from	  the	  supposition	  that	  our	  normative	  talk	  and	  thought	  encompasses	  a	  plurality	  of	  oughts	  –	  in	  particular,	  a	  plurality	  of	  oughts	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  operating	  in	  the	  service	  of,	  and	  playing	  distinct	  roles	  associated	  with,	  what	  I	  shall	  call	  different	  core	  normative	  
practices	  (cf	  Jackson	  1991,	  pp.	  471-­‐72;	  Parfit	  2011,	  pp.	  35-­‐6;	  Schroeder	  2011).2	  The	  claim	  that	  our	  ambivalence	  must	  involve	  a	  mistake	  is	  tempting	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  assuming	  that	  there	  is	  some	  single	  privileged	  ought	  at	  play	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible.”	  But	  the	  supposition	  that	  there	  is	  a	  plurality	  of	  oughts	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  playing	  importantly	  different	  roles	  naturally	  points	  toward	  an	  alternative.	  The	  alternative	  holds	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  we	  are	  mistakenly	  conflating	  the	  true	  principle	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  with	  some	  related	  but	  false	  idea:	  e.g.	  that	  it’s	  not	  the	  case	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  try	  to	  do	  what	  is	  infeasible	  (Southwood	  and	  Wiens	  forthcoming,	  section	  5).	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  we	  are	  mistakenly	  conflating	  the	  false	  principle	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  with	  some	  true	  related	  but	  distinct	  idea:	  either	  a)	  that	  “ought”	  is	  related	  to	  “feasible”	  in	  some	  other	  way	  (e.g.	  that	  feasibility	  is	  (sometimes)	  substantively	  significant	  (Brennan	  and	  Pettit	  2005;	  Cohen	  2008;	  Estlund	  2011;	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2013);	  or	  that	  “ought”	  conversationally	  implies	  “feasible”	  (c.f.	  Sinnott-­‐Armstrong	  1984);	  or	  that	  infeasibility	  is	  excusing);	  or	  b)	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  (or	  is	  otherwise	  related	  to)	  something	  like	  “feasible,”	  such	  as	  “not	  too	  demanding”	  (cf	  Nagel	  1991,	  ch.	  3)	  or	  “not	  too	  difficult.”	  I	  confess	  that	  I	  don’t	  find	  this	  response	  –	  in	  either	  form	  –	  remotely	  plausible.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  our	  ambivalent	  reactions	  simply	  seem	  more	  persistent	  and	  powerful	  than	  any	  such	  attempt	  to	  explain	  them	  away.	  But	  I	  won’t	  try	  to	  argue	  for	  that	  here.	  2	  To	  anticipate,	  the	  core	  normative	  practices	  that	  I	  shall	  focus	  on	  are	  prescriptive,	  evaluative,	  deliberative	  and	  hypological	  practices.	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that	  whether	  or	  not	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  depends	  on	  which	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  is	  at	  issue.	  There	  is	  some	  salient	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  for	  which	  it’s	  true	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible.”	  There	  is	  some	  other	  salient	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  for	  which	  it’s	  false	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible.”	  The	  interpretation	  of	  those	  normative	  claims	  that	  seems	  false	  on	  account	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible	  –	  and	  for	  which	  it	  seems	  objectionably	  unworldly	  to	  insist	  otherwise	  –	  involves	  the	  former.	  	  The	  interpretation	  of	  the	  claims	  that	  seems	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible	  –	  and	  for	  which	  it	  seems	  unduly	  lenient	  to	  insist	  otherwise	  –	  involves	  the	  latter.	  Our	  ambivalence,	  far	  from	  involving	  any	  mistake,	  is	  entirely	  appropriate.	  This	  is	  the	  possibility	  I	  wish	  to	  explore	  in	  detail.3	  After	  offering	  a	  more	  precise	  characterization	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  that	  is	  at	  play	  (section	  II),	  I	  shall	  sketch	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  different	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts	  in	  general	  (section	  III)	  and	  then	  use	  this	  framework	  to	  consider	  which	  particular	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts,	  if	  any,	  might	  be	  capable	  of	  vindicating	  our	  ambivalence.	  I	  shall	  consider	  and	  reject	  a	  prevalent	  and	  prima	  facie	  promising	  account	  according	  to	  which	  the	  relevant	  oughts	  are	  the	  
prescriptive	  ought	  and	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  (section	  IV).	  I	  shall	  then	  propose	  a	  different	  account	  that	  holds	  that	  the	  oughts	  we	  need	  are	  instead	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  (section	  V)	  and	  the	  hypological	  ought	  (section	  VI).4	  An	  account	  of	  this	  kind	  affords	  us	  a	  compelling	  way	  of	  vindicating	  our	  ambivalence.	  Or	  so	  I	  shall	  argue.	  	  II.	  FEASIBILITY	  AS	  WHAT	  WE	  CAN	  BRING	  OURSELVES	  TO	  DO	  There	  are	  many	  things	  we	  might	  mean	  by	  describing	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  particular	  state	  of	  affairs	  as	  “feasible”	  or	  “infeasible.”5	  By	  “feasible”	  let	  me	  stipulate	  that	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  specifically	  what	  we	  can	  bring	  ourselves	  to	  do	  in	  the	  sense	  helpfully	  articulated	  by	  David	  Estlund	  in	  an	  important	  recent	  paper	  (Estlund	  2011).	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  I	  shall	  assume,	  following	  Estlund,	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  mean	  simply	  what	  we	  can	  do	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  what	  we	  are	  able	  to	  do	  (Estlund	  2011,	  pp.	  219-­‐21;	  see	  also	  Vihvelin	  2004,	  pp.	  443-­‐4).	  It	  may	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A	  number	  of	  other	  theorists	  have	  also	  made	  suggestions	  along	  similar	  lines	  (see	  below,	  section	  IV).	  However,	  first,	  the	  accounts	  to	  date	  have	  been	  brief	  and	  gestural.	  In	  particular,	  virtually	  nothing	  has	  been	  said	  about	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  different	  oughts.	  But,	  without	  such	  an	  account	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  evaluate	  the	  claim	  that	  particular	  oughts	  are	  such	  that	  it	  is	  true	  or	  false	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible.”	  Second,	  as	  I	  shall	  argue,	  the	  particular	  oughts	  that	  have	  been	  adduced	  (the	  prescriptive	  ought	  and	  the	  evaluative	  ought)	  are	  the	  wrong	  oughts	  to	  vindicate	  our	  ambivalence.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  do	  better	  on	  both	  fronts.	  4	  I	  am	  not	  the	  first	  theorist	  to	  make	  use	  of	  this	  pair	  of	  oughts.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  are	  sometimes	  evoked,	  at	  least	  implicitly,	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  ambivalent	  reactions	  many	  of	  us	  have	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  case	  of	  Professor	  Procrastinate	  (see	  Jackson	  and	  Pargetter	  1986).	  But	  they	  have	  not	  been	  applied	  hitherto	  to	  the	  feasibility	  issue	  in	  particular.	  5	  There	  has	  been	  an	  enormous	  recent	  surge	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  feasibility	  and	  its	  normative	  relevance.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Raikka	  1998;	  Cohen	  2003;	  2008;	  Mason	  2004;	  Brennan	  and	  Pettit	  2005;	  Brennan	  and	  Southwood	  2007;	  Southwood	  2015;	  2016;	  Southwood	  and	  Wiens	  forthcoming;	  Estlund	  2007,	  ch.	  14;	  2011;	  2014;	  Swift	  2008;	  Gilabert	  2009;	  2011;	  forthcoming;	  Gilabert	  and	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2012;	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2012;	  2013;	  Hamlin	  and	  Stemplowska	  2012;	  Miller	  2013;	  Gheaus	  2013;	  Wiens	  2013;	  2014;	  2015.	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that	  I	  can	  (i.e.	  am	  able	  to)	  save	  the	  life	  of	  a	  fellow	  surfer	  who	  is	  being	  attacked	  by	  a	  four-­‐foot	  bronze-­‐whaler,	  yet	  cannot	  bring	  myself	  to	  do	  so.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  my	  wife	  and	  I	  can	  (i.e.	  are	  
able	  to)	  give	  up	  our	  beautiful	  newborn	  baby	  for	  adoption,	  but	  cannot	  bring	  ourselves	  to	  do	  so.6	  I	  take	  the	  notion	  of	  what	  we	  can	  bring	  ourselves	  to	  do	  to	  be	  a	  relatively	  intuitive	  one.	  But	  can	  we	  do	  something	  to	  explicate	  the	  notion?	  Estlund	  does	  not	  offer	  such	  an	  explication.	  I	  shall	  offer	  one	  on	  his	  behalf.7	  Consider	  the	  following	  example:	  	   Suppose	  Bill	  pleads	  that	  he	  is	  not	  required	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  because	  he	  is	  motivationally	  unable	  to	  bring	  himself	  to	  do	  it.	  …	  He	  is	  simply	  deeply	  selfish	  and	  so	  cannot	  thoroughly	  will	  to	  comply.	  Dumping	  his	  trash	  by	  the	  road	  is	  easier	  than	  wrapping	  it	  properly	  and	  putting	  it	  by	  the	  curb	  or	  taking	  it	  to	  the	  dump.	  He	  wishes	  he	  had	  more	  willpower,	  and	  yet	  he	  doesn’t	  have	  it.	  Refraining	  is	  something	  he	  could,	  in	  all	  other	  respects,	  easily	  do,	  except	  that	  he	  can’t	  thoroughly	  will	  to	  do	  it	  (Estlund	  2011,	  p.	  220).	  	   The	  example	  of	  Bill	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  an	  example	  of	  someone	  who	  can	  do	  something	  but	  who	  cannot	  bring	  himself	  to	  do	  it.	  According	  to	  Estlund,	  when	  we	  say	  that	  an	  agent	  “can”	  do	  something,	  we	  are	  saying	  that	  she	  is	  able	  to	  act	  in	  that	  way.	  Estlund	  endorses	  a	  simple	  version	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “conditional”	  account	  of	  ability	  (see	  Moore	  1912,	  chs	  1,	  6).	  In	  particular,	  he	  holds	  that:	  	   (2) An	  agent	  A	  can	  (is	  able	  to)	  X	  if	  and	  only	  if	  were	  A	  to	  try	  and	  not	  give	  up,	  then	  A	  would	  be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to	  X	  (Estlund	  2011,	  p.	  212).	  	  Given	  (2),	  it	  follows	  straightforwardly	  that	  Bill	  can	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  That’s	  because	  if	  Bill	  were	  to	  try	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  and	  not	  give	  up,	  then	  he	  would	  be	  virtually	  certain	  to	  succeed.	  However,	  (2)	  faces	  familiar	  counterexamples	  involving	  so-­‐called	  “finkish	  dispositions”	  (Vihvelin	  2004).	  So	  I	  propose	  instead	  a	  “dispositional”	  analogue	  of	  (2),	  i.e.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  How	  is	  this	  supposed	  to	  work	  in	  the	  context	  of	  groups?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  abilities,	  Estlund	  has	  suggested	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “ability	  bridge	  principle.”	  This	  holds	  that:	  “Meeting	  some	  standard	  is	  within	  a	  [group’s]	  abilities	  only	  if	  any	  individual	  behaviors	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  if	  the	  [group]	  is	  to	  meet	  that	  standard	  are	  within	  those	  individuals’	  abilities”	  (Estlund	  2011,	  p.	  236).	  In	  the	  same	  spirit,	  I	  suggest	  what	  we	  might	  call	  the	  “feasibility	  bridge	  principle.”	  This	  holds	  that:	  It	  is	  feasible	  for	  a	  group	  to	  meet	  some	  standard	  only	  if	  any	  individual	  behaviors	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  if	  the	  group	  is	  to	  meet	  that	  standard	  are	  ones	  that	  the	  individuals	  can	  bring	  themselves	  to	  perform.	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  are	  certain	  important	  complexities	  concerning	  how	  to	  conceptualize	  feasibility	  in	  the	  context	  of	  groups	  that	  I	  am	  simply	  setting	  aside	  here.	  For	  discussion	  see	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2012.	  7	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Jonathan	  Quong	  for	  persuading	  me	  of	  the	  need	  to	  do	  more	  than	  offer	  an	  intuitive	  gloss.	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(3) An	  agent	  A	  can	  (is	  able	  to)	  X	  if	  and	  only	  if	  A	  is	  disposed,	  insofar	  as	  A	  tries	  to	  X	  and	  does	  not	  give	  up	  trying	  to	  X,	  to	  (be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to)	  X	  (cf	  Vihvelin	  2004,	  pp.	  437-­‐40;	  Southwood	  and	  Gilabert	  ms).8	  	  Like	  (2),	  (3)	  also	  implies	  that	  Bill	  can	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  That’s	  because	  Bill	  is	  disposed	  to	  be	  virtually	  certain	  to	  succeed	  in	  refraining	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  insofar	  as	  he	  tries	  and	  does	  not	  give	  up.	  But,	  unlike	  (2),	  (3)	  avoids	  finkish	  counterexamples	  –	  at	  least	  given	  plausible	  and	  widespread	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  dispositions.9	  What	  about	  the	  claim	  that	  Bill	  cannot	  bring	  himself	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish?	  Estlund	  doesn’t	  offer	  any	  account	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  say	  that	  an	  agent	  “can	  bring	  herself”	  to	  do	  something,	  though	  he	  does	  speak	  repeatedly	  and	  suggestively	  of	  “motivational	  capacities”	  (Estlund	  2011,	  e.g.	  pp.	  207,	  208,	  210	  n4,	  211-­‐12,	  226).	  Kadri	  Vihvelin	  (2004,	  pp.	  443-­‐44),	  who	  also	  employs	  the	  locution,	  offers	  some	  further	  instructive	  remarks	  in	  defending	  her	  version	  of	  the	  dispositional	  account	  of	  ability	  from	  a	  classic	  counterexample	  (Lehrer	  1968,	  p.	  32;	  Wolf	  1990,	  p.	  99).	  The	  counterexample	  involves	  an	  agent	  who	  “suffers	  from	  some	  pathological	  condition	  which	  either	  impairs	  her	  capacity	  to	  make	  a	  rational	  decision	  concerning	  some	  particular	  kind	  of	  action	  (e.g.,	  claustrophobia,	  e.g.,	  a	  pianist	  overcome	  by	  stage-­‐fright)	  or	  impairs	  her	  capacity	  to	  make	  any	  rational	  decision	  about	  what	  to	  do.	  But	  if	  she	  (somehow,	  miraculously)	  decided	  (or	  chose,	  formed	  the	  intention,	  etc.)	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  action,	  she	  would	  succeed”	  (Vihvelin	  (2004,	  p.	  443).	  We	  can	  also	  suppose	  that	  she	  is	  disposed	  to	  do	  so.	  According	  to	  Vihvelin,	  we	  should	  respond	  by	  insisting	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  perfectly	  able	  to	  act	  in	  the	  relevant	  ways.	  “She	  knows	  how	  to	  walk;	  her	  legs	  aren't	  paralyzed.	  She	  knows	  how	  to	  play	  piano;	  her	  fingers	  aren't	  broken.”	  What	  the	  agent	  “lacks	  [is]	  the	  ability	  to	  bring	  herself	  to	  do	  those	  things;	  she	  cannot	  use	  her	  reasoning	  ability	  
to	  bring	  it	  about	  that	  she	  intentionally	  does	  these	  things.	  Due	  to	  her	  phobia	  (stage	  fright,	  panic,	  etc.),	  she	  is	  unable	  to	  choose	  or	  try	  to	  act	  according	  to	  her	  own	  conception	  of	  what	  
counts	  as	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  acting”	  (Vihvelin	  2004,	  p.	  443;	  italics	  added).	  If	  we	  put	  these	  ideas	  together,	  we	  get	  the	  following:	  An	  agent	  can	  bring	  herself	  to	  perform	  some	  act	  only	  if	  she	  has	  certain	  capacities	  that,	  while	  not	  required	  for	  her	  to	  be	  able	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  as	  such,	  are	  required	  for	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  rational-­‐volitional	  route	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  (3),	  like	  (2),	  faces	  other	  objections	  as	  well	  (e.g.	  Austin	  1956,	  p.	  218).	  For	  discussion,	  see	  e.g.	  Maier	  2014	  and	  Vihvelin	  2004.	  For	  the	  most	  part	  these	  objections	  are	  not	  relevant	  for	  our	  purposes	  here,	  so	  I	  shall	  set	  them	  aside.	  One	  objection	  that	  is	  relevant	  is	  the	  classic	  counterexample	  to	  its	  sufficiency	  offered	  by	  Lehrer	  (1968,	  p.	  32)	  and	  Wolf	  (1990,	  p.	  99)	  that	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  paragraph.	  9	  (3)	  will	  be	  susceptible	  to	  finkish	  counterexamples	  only	  insofar	  as	  we	  understand	  the	  disposition	  in	  (3)	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  subjunctive	  conditional	  in	  (2).	  But	  C.	  B.	  Martin	  (1994),	  David	  Lewis	  (1997)	  and	  others	  taught	  us	  that,	  in	  general,	  it	  is	  a	  very	  bad	  idea	  to	  analyze	  dispositions	  in	  terms	  of	  subjunctive	  conditionals	  –	  precisely	  because	  such	  analyses	  are	  susceptible	  to	  counterexamples	  involving	  finks.	  Once	  we	  understand	  the	  disposition	  in	  (3)	  in	  the	  right	  (fink-­‐proof)	  way,	  then	  (3)	  obviously	  won’t	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  such	  counterexamples.	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performing	  the	  action.	  I	  take	  it	  that	  at	  least	  three	  sorts	  of	  capacities	  are	  required	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  act.	  First,	  the	  agent	  must	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  she	  ought	  to	  do	  so.	  Suppose	  that	  one	  is	  a	  longstanding	  victim	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  One	  recognizes	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  leave	  one’s	  abusive	  partner	  and	  yet	  one’s	  self-­‐conception	  has	  been	  eroded	  to	  the	  point	  that	  one	  is	  incapable	  of	  deciding	  to	  do	  what	  one	  knows	  one	  ought	  to	  do.	  Suppose	  that,	  unlike	  many	  others	  in	  one’s	  situation,	  one	  has	  access	  to	  sufficiently	  robust	  personal	  networks	  that	  would	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  one	  is	  robustly	  disposed	  to	  succeed	  in	  leaving	  one’s	  partner	  insofar	  as	  one	  tries	  and	  does	  not	  give	  up.	  So	  one	  is	  able	  to	  leave	  one’s	  partner.	  Yet	  one	  is	  incapable	  of	  taking,	  as	  it	  were,	  the	  volitional	  first	  step	  of	  deciding	  to	  do	  what	  one	  recognizes	  one	  ought	  to	  do.	  Every	  time	  one	  revisits	  the	  issue,	  one	  finds	  oneself	  either	  deciding	  to	  stay,	  or	  at	  least	  deferring	  the	  decision	  to	  leave,	  in	  spite	  of	  one’s	  better	  judgment.10	  Second,	  the	  agent	  must	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  try	  to	  perform	  the	  act.	  Suppose	  that	  one’s	  colleague	  is	  having	  a	  heart-­‐attack	  right	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  glass-­‐bottomed	  bridge	  thousands	  of	  feet	  above	  the	  ground	  while	  one	  watches	  in	  dismay	  from	  the	  side	  (cf	  Estlund	  2011,	  p.	  230).	  To	  survive,	  she	  needs	  someone	  to	  come	  and	  give	  her	  urgent	  CPR.	  One	  is	  able	  to	  save	  her	  life	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  robustly	  disposed	  to	  succeed	  in	  saving	  her	  life	  insofar	  as	  one	  tries	  to	  save	  her	  life	  and	  doesn’t	  give	  up.	  Moreover,	  one	  may	  have	  and	  indeed	  exercise	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  to	  save	  her	  life	  by	  venturing	  out	  onto	  the	  bridge	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  do	  so.	  “I’m	  going	  to	  do	  it!”	  one	  says	  to	  oneself.	  But	  one	  has	  a	  paralyzing	  case	  of	  acrophobia	  in	  consequence	  of	  which	  one	  is	  incapable	  of	  trying.	  Trying	  in	  this	  context	  involves	  somehow	  “activating”	  one’s	  decision.	  And	  one	  is	  incapable	  of	  activating	  one’s	  decision.	  Every	  time	  one	  goes	  to	  take	  a	  step	  towards	  the	  bridge,	  one	  finds	  oneself	  blocked	  by	  one’s	  own	  psychology.	  Third,	  the	  agent	  must	  have	  the	  capacity	  not	  to	  give	  up	  (trying	  to	  perform	  the	  act).	  Suppose	  that	  one	  has	  accepted	  to	  referee	  a	  paper	  for	  a	  journal	  (cf	  Jackson	  and	  Pargetter	  1986).	  One	  is	  perfectly	  able	  to	  complete	  the	  refereeing	  assignment	  inasmuch	  as	  one	  is	  robustly	  disposed	  to	  complete	  it	  insofar	  as	  one	  tries	  and	  doesn’t	  give	  up.	  Let’s	  suppose,	  moreover,	  that	  one	  is	  perfectly	  capable	  of	  deciding	  to	  complete	  the	  task	  and	  trying	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Does	  being	  able	  to	  bring	  oneself	  to	  perform	  an	  act	  really	  require	  such	  a	  fine-­‐grained	  capacity	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  simpliciter?	  Consider	  Unreflective	  Unwin,	  who	  happens	  to	  have	  a	  peculiar	  loathing	  for	  normative	  talk	  and	  thought	  in	  consequence	  of	  which	  he	  is	  incapable	  of	  deciding	  to	  visit	  his	  elderly	  great-­‐aunt	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  he	  ought	  to,	  but	  who	  nonetheless	  is	  perfectly	  capable	  of	  deciding	  to	  visit	  his	  great-­‐aunt	  –	  so	  long	  as	  his	  thought	  processes	  are	  unencumbered	  by	  beliefs	  about	  ought	  and	  obligation	  (Southwood	  and	  Eriksson	  2011,	  p.	  200;	  cf	  Arpaly	  2000).	  Let’s	  grant	  that	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  might	  well	  describe	  Unwin	  as	  “able	  to	  bring	  himself	  to	  visit	  his	  great-­‐aunt.”	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  sense	  I	  have	  in	  mind.	  The	  sense	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  –	  to	  quote	  Vihvelin,	  once	  again	  –	  we	  are	  able	  “to	  choose	  or	  try	  to	  act	  according	  to	  [our]	  own	  conception	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  acting”	  (Vihvelin	  2004,	  p.	  443).	  For	  that	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  is	  insufficient.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  persuading	  me	  that	  we	  need	  the	  fine-­‐grained	  capacity.	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Indeed,	  one	  exercises	  these	  capacities	  every	  morning,	  making	  oneself	  a	  nice	  cup	  of	  tea	  and	  sitting	  down	  at	  one’s	  desk	  with	  the	  paper	  before	  one.	  Yet,	  while	  one	  is	  capable	  of	  deciding	  and	  for	  that	  matter	  trying,	  one	  is	  incapable	  of	  avoiding	  giving	  up.	  One’s	  propensity	  to	  procrastinate	  is	  too	  potent	  to	  be	  overcome.	  The	  prospect	  of	  doing	  the	  daily	  crossword,	  informing	  oneself	  about	  the	  upcoming	  Ashes	  tour,	  arranging	  photos	  of	  one’s	  recent	  trip	  to	  Vanuatu	  –	  doing	  anything	  but	  the	  damned	  review	  –	  proves	  simply	  too	  alluring.	  We	  might	  wonder	  what	  it	  is	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  have	  these	  capacities.	  I	  tentatively	  suggest	  the	  following:	  	   (4) An	  agent	  A	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  rationally	  decide	  to	  X	  only	  if	  A	  is	  disposed,	  insofar	  as	  A	  believes	  she	  ought	  to	  X,	  to	  (be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to)	  decide	  to	  X	  (on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  she	  ought	  to	  X).	  (5) An	  agent	  A	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  try	  to	  X	  only	  if	  A	  is	  disposed,	  insofar	  as	  A	  decides	  to	  X,	  to	  (be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to)	  try	  to	  X.	  (6) An	  agent	  A	  has	  the	  capacity	  not	  to	  give	  up	  trying	  to	  X	  only	  if	  A	  is	  disposed,	  insofar	  as	  A	  tries	  to	  X,	  (to	  be	  sufficiently	  likely)	  not	  to	  give	  up	  trying	  to	  X.11	  	  This	  gives	  us	  a	  somewhat	  clearer	  idea	  of	  how	  it	  might	  be	  that	  Bill	  is	  able	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish,	  yet	  unable	  to	  bring	  himself	  to	  refrain	  from	  doing	  so.	  Here	  are	  three	  possibilities.	  He	  is	  not	  disposed	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to	  decide	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  insofar	  as	  he	  believes	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping.	  Or	  he	  is	  not	  disposed	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to	  try	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  insofar	  as	  he	  decides	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping.	  Or	  he	  is	  not	  disposed	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  likely	  not	  to	  give	  up	  trying	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  insofar	  as	  he	  tries	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  	  III.	  ON	  THE	  PLURALITY	  OF	  OUGHTS	  I	  am	  supposing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  plurality	  of	  oughts	  –	  in	  particular,	  a	  plurality	  of	  oughts	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  operating	  in	  the	  service	  of,	  and	  playing	  distinct	  roles	  associated	  with,	  different	  core	  normative	  practices.	  This	  is	  obviously	  a	  controversial	  view.	  I	  shan’t	  try	  to	  defend	  it.	  Rather,	  I	  shall	  be	  supposing	  it	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  seeing	  whether	  it	  affords	  us	  a	  persuasive	  way	  of	  vindicating	  the	  ambivalent	  reactions	  that	  many	  of	  us	  have	  to	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible.	  But	  I	  do	  need	  to	  make	  it	  more	  precise.	  How	  am	  I	  supposing	  that	  we	  understand	  these	  different	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  claims	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  As	  with	  (3),	  there	  remain	  potential	  counterexamples	  to	  (4),	  (5)	  and	  (6)	  as	  they	  stand.	  I	  shall	  assume	  that	  whatever	  modifications	  suffice	  to	  make	  (3)	  immune	  to	  these	  counterexamples	  should	  also	  be	  made	  to	  (4),	  (5)	  and	  (6).	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general?	  And	  how	  am	  I	  supposing	  that	  we	  go	  about	  establishing	  whether	  particular	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  claims	  do	  or	  don’t	  imply	  “feasible?”12	  The	  framework	  within	  which	  I	  shall	  be	  operating	  involves	  two	  key	  theses.	  The	  first	  thesis	  holds	  that	  ought	  claims	  involve	  different	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  different	  core	  normative	  practices.	  Call	  this	  the	  fitting	  
use	  thesis.	  The	  basic	  idea	  is	  that	  each	  of	  our	  core	  normative	  practices	  involves	  what	  I	  shall	  call	  a	  canonical	  task	  and	  a	  canonical	  executor	  of	  that	  task.	  For	  an	  ought	  claim	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  practice	  means	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  a	  relevant	  canonical	  executor	  in	  the	  relevant	  canonical	  task	  associated	  with	  the	  practice.	  So,	  to	  say	  that	  an	  ought	  claim	  involves	  a	  particular	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  claim	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  –	  and,	  hence,	  that	  its	  truth	  depends	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  –	  by	  a	  relevant	  canonical	  executor	  in	  the	  relevant	  canonical	  task.	  	  Take	  the	  so-­‐called	  prescriptive	  ought.	  The	  core	  normative	  practice	  in	  the	  service	  of	  which	  claims	  involving	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  operating	  is	  our	  
prescriptive	  practice.	  The	  canonical	  task	  associated	  with	  our	  prescriptive	  practice	  involves	  some	  special	  mode	  of	  prescription:	  say,	  giving	  advice,	  or	  making	  demands,	  or	  issuing	  injunctions.	  The	  canonical	  executor	  is	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  prescriber:	  for	  example,	  a	  would-­‐be	  adviser	  who	  is	  privy	  to	  relevant	  information	  and	  who	  has	  the	  requisite	  “standing”	  to	  advise.	  So,	  the	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  says	  that	  an	  ought	  claim	  (of	  the	  form	  A	  ought	  to	  X)	  involves	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  just	  in	  case	  a)	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  some	  such	  appropriately	  situated	  prescriber	  to	  prescribe	  that	  A	  performs	  X,	  and	  b)	  the	  claim	  is	  true	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  in	  fact	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  way.	  Or	  take	  the	  so-­‐called	  evaluative	  ought.	  The	  core	  normative	  practice	  in	  the	  service	  of	  which	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  operating	  is	  our	  
evaluative	  practice.	  The	  canonical	  task	  associated	  with	  our	  evaluative	  practice	  is	  some	  special	  mode	  of	  evaluation:	  say,	  one	  that	  involves	  making	  claims	  about	  what	  would	  be	  good	  or	  desirable.	  The	  canonical	  executor	  is	  some	  appropriately	  situated	  evaluator:	  say,	  an	  evaluator	  who	  is	  privy	  to	  relevant	  information	  and	  impartial.	  So	  the	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  says	  that	  an	  ought	  claim	  (of	  the	  form	  A	  ought	  to	  X)	  involves	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  just	  in	  case	  a)	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  evaluator	  to	  positively	  evaluate	  A’s	  Xing,	  and	  b)	  the	  claim	  is	  true	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  in	  fact	  fit	  to	  be	  thus	  used.	  And	  so	  on.	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  What	  kind	  of	  semantic	  theory	  am	  I	  committing	  myself	  to	  in	  talking	  of	  “a	  plurality	  of	  oughts?”	  There	  are	  two	  possibilities,	  and	  I	  won’t	  try	  to	  decide	  between	  them.	  The	  first	  possibility	  is	  that	  our	  talk	  and	  thought	  involving	  “ought”	  is	  literally	  ambiguous.	  There	  are	  different	  concepts	  of	  ought	  corresponding	  to	  the	  different	  practices	  in	  the	  service	  of	  which	  “ought”	  claims	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  operating	  (see	  Schroeder	  2011).	  The	  second	  possibility	  is	  that	  “ought”	  claims	  can	  express	  different	  propositions	  without	  ambiguity.	  On	  this	  view,	  “ought”	  is	  univocal	  but	  relative	  to	  a	  “modal	  base”	  and	  an	  “ordering	  source”	  (Kratzer	  1977),	  and	  the	  modal	  base	  of	  any	  ought	  claim	  includes	  an	  implicit	  specification	  of	  the	  practice	  in	  the	  service	  of	  which	  the	  claim	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  operating.	  Thanks	  to	  Billy	  Dunaway	  and	  a	  referee	  for	  help	  here.	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Different	  ought	  claims	  differ	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  supposed	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  by	  relevant	  canonical	  executors	  in	  carrying	  out	  relevant	  canonical	  tasks.	  Notice	  that	  the	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  helps	  to	  explain	  how	  ought	  judgments	  might	  be	  true	  insofar	  as	  they	  involve	  one	  kind	  of	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  and	  false	  insofar	  as	  they	  involve	  some	  other	  kind	  of	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought.	  Consider	  Mark	  Schroeder’s	  case	  of	  Luckless	  Larry:	  	   Luckless	  Larry	  …	  has	  recently	  come	  by	  many	  misfortunes	  –	  his	  parents	  and	  siblings	  have	  recently	  passed	  away,	  his	  wife	  has	  divorced	  him	  to	  run	  off	  with	  a	  younger	  man,	  he	  has	  lost	  his	  job	  including	  his	  health	  insurance,	  and	  he	  has	  recently	  been	  diagnosed	  with	  kidney	  disease,	  which	  will	  require	  expensive	  treatment.	  Larry	  deserves	  to	  win	  the	  lottery,	  if	  anyone	  does.	  So	  if	  there	  is	  to	  be	  any	  justice	  in	  this	  world,	  then	  Larry	  ought	  to	  win	  the	  lottery	  (Schroeder	  2011,	  p.	  8).	  	  Now	  consider	  the	  claim	  that	  	   (7) Larry	  ought	  to	  win	  the	  lottery.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  (7)	  might	  seem	  to	  be	  true.	  The	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  can	  help	  to	  explain	  why.	  For	  (7)	  does	  indeed	  seem	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  evaluation.	  That	  is,	  it	  seems	  perfectly	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  evaluator	  to	  evaluate	  positively	  Larry’s	  winning	  the	  lottery.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  (7)	  that	  seems	  true	  is	  one	  that	  involves	  the	  evaluative	  ought.	  (7)	  seems	  true	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  evaluation.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  (7)	  might	  also	  seem	  to	  be	  false.	  Again,	  the	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  can	  explain	  why.	  For	  (7)	  seems	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription.	  That	  is,	  it	  seems	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  prescriber	  with	  the	  requisite	  standing	  to	  prescribe	  (e.g.	  to	  advise	  or	  demand	  or	  enjoin)	  Larry	  to	  win	  the	  lottery.	  This	  suggests	  that	  (7)	  is	  false	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription	  –	  and,	  hence,	  false	  insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  prescriptive	  ought.	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  confuse	  the	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  with	  the	  quite	  different	  idea	  that	  ought	  claims	  involve	  some	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  just	  in	  case	  they	  are	  actually	  used	  in	  the	  relevant	  practice.	  Call	  this	  the	  actual	  use	  thesis.	  Consider	  the	  claim	  that	  	  (8) Malcolm	  Turnbull,	  the	  current	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Australia,	  ought	  to	  lobby	  his	  conservative	  colleagues	  in	  favor	  of	  legalizing	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  in	  Australia.	  	  Suppose	  that	  being	  a	  mere	  philosopher	  I	  will	  never	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  advise	  or	  recommend,	  still	  less	  demand	  or	  enjoin	  Turnbull	  to	  do	  anything	  –	  and,	  hence,	  that	  I	  will	  never	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  use	  (8)	  in	  prescribing.	  The	  actual	  use	  thesis	  implies	  that	  I	  will	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never	  employ	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  to	  judge	  that	  (8).	  The	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  does	  not	  have	  this	  implication.	  It	  is	  enough	  that	  my	  judgment	  involves	  a	  claim	  whose	  truth	  is	  dependent,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  advising,	  or	  demanding,	  or	  enjoining	  that	  Turnbull	  acts	  in	  this	  way,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  ever	  actually	  used	  in	  that	  way.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  distinguish	  the	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  ought	  claims	  involve	  some	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  just	  in	  case	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  relevant	  practice	  by	  a	  judge.	  Call	  this	  the	  judgment-­‐relative	  fitting	  use	  thesis.	  Consider	  Gary	  Watson’s	  unsportsmanlike	  and	  vanquished	  squash-­‐player	  who	  is	  virtually	  certain,	  insofar	  as	  she	  goes	  to	  shake	  the	  hand	  of	  her	  victorious	  opponent,	  to	  end	  up	  smashing	  him	  in	  the	  face	  (Watson	  1982;	  Smith	  1995).	  Suppose	  that	  Watson’s	  squash-­‐players	  judges	  that:	  	   (9) Right	  now	  I	  ought	  to	  go	  away	  and	  cool	  off	  rather	  than	  go	  and	  shake	  my	  opponent’s	  hand.	  	  Suppose	  that	  prescription	  is	  essentially	  second-­‐personal	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  only	  possible	  to	  advise	  or	  demand	  or	  enjoin	  another	  agent	  to	  perform	  some	  act;	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  advise	  or	  demand	  or	  enjoin	  oneself	  to	  perform	  an	  act	  (contra	  Smith	  1994,	  p.	  151).	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  judgment-­‐relative	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  would	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  Watson’s	  squash-­‐player	  to	  use	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  in	  normative	  judgments	  such	  as	  (9).	  By	  contrast,	  the	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  does	  not	  have	  this	  implication.	  It	  is	  enough	  that	  her	  judgment	  involves	  a	  claim	  whose	  truth	  is	  dependent,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  a	  relevant	  
canonical	  executor.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  claims	  that	  involve	  the	  prescriptive	  ought,	  the	  relevant	  canonical	  executor	  is	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  prescriber	  and,	  hence,	  some	  other	  agent.	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  an	  ought	  claim	  to	  be	  “fit	  to	  be	  used”	  in	  a	  practice?13	  Consider	  an	  analogy	  (cf	  Aristotle	  1970,	  book	  2).	  Some	  materials	  (e.g.	  tiles,	  corrugated	  iron,	  thatch)	  are	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house.	  Others	  (e.g.	  Styrofoam,	  cardboard,	  calcium)	  are	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  practice.	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  a	  particular	  material	  is	  fit	  (or	  unfit)	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house?	  The	  obvious	  answer	  is	  that	  it	  means	  that	  the	  material	  has	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  physical	  
profile	  to	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house.	  The	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  a	  practice	  is	  an	  aim	  such	  that	  the	  practice	  only	  counts	  as	  the	  particular	  practice	  it	  does	  in	  virtue	  of	  bona	  fide	  participants	  in	  the	  practice	  typically	  possessing	  and	  acting	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  aim.	  The	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house	  is,	  roughly,	  to	  offer	  sustained	  protection	  from	  the	  elements.	  So,	  the	  materials	  that	  are	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house	  are	  fit	  to	  be	  thus	  used	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  One	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  take	  the	  notion	  as	  a	  primitive	  and	  trust	  that	  you	  know	  what	  I’m	  talking	  about.	  (A	  number	  of	  philosophers	  who	  have	  employed	  the	  notion	  of	  “fitness”	  or	  “fittingness”	  have	  taken	  this	  approach	  (see	  e.g.	  McHugh	  and	  Way	  forthcoming;	  Chappell	  2012).)	  I	  shall	  try	  to	  do	  better.	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possess	  properties	  (durability,	  non-­‐porousness,	  non-­‐reactivity)	  that	  are	  required	  to	  achieve	  the	  aim	  of	  offering	  sustained	  protection	  from	  the	  elements.	  The	  materials	  that	  are	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house	  are	  unfit	  inasmuch	  as	  they	  lack	  these	  properties.	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  understand	  the	  notion	  of	  “fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  core	  normative	  practice”	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way.	  Just	  as	  the	  practice	  of	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house	  has	  a	  constitutive	  aim,	  core	  normative	  practices	  also	  have	  different	  constitutive	  aims	  (see	  Korsgaard	  1996;	  2009;	  Velleman	  2000;	  Katsafanas	  2013).	  And	  just	  as	  the	  fitness	  of	  a	  material	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  whether	  it	  has	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  physical	  profile	  to	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  the	  particular	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  constructing	  the	  roof	  of	  a	  house,	  the	  fitness	  of	  an	  ought	  claim	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  core	  normative	  practice	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  whether	  it	  has	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  agential	  profile	  to	  be	  used	  by	  a	  relevant	  canonical	  executor	  in	  the	  relevant	  canonical	  task	  to	  achieve	  the	  particular	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  the	  practice	  in	  question.	  This	  is	  the	  second	  key	  thesis	  of	  our	  framework.	  Call	  it	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  thesis.	  The	  constitutive	  aim	  thesis	  offers	  a	  nice	  explanation	  of	  our	  verdicts	  about	  the	  fitness	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  Luckless	  Larry	  ought	  to	  win	  the	  lottery	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription	  and	  evaluation.	  The	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prescription	  is	  presumably	  practical:	  to	  get	  the	  agent	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act	  by	  heeding	  the	  prescription	  –	  for	  example,	  by	  following	  advice,	  or	  fulfilling	  a	  demand,	  or	  complying	  with	  an	  injunction.	  Our	  prescriptive	  practice	  only	  exists	  in	  the	  particular	  form	  it	  does	  because	  bona	  fide	  participants	  in	  the	  practice	  typically	  possess	  and	  act	  in	  pursuit	  of	  this	  aim.14	  But	  the	  claim	  that	  Larry	  ought	  to	  win	  the	  lottery	  does	  not	  have	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  profile	  to	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim.	  Even	  if	  Larry	  wins	  the	  lottery,	  there	  is	  no	  prospect	  of	  his	  winning	  the	  lottery	  by	  following	  advice	  to	  win	  the	  lottery.	  We	  can	  only	  follow	  advice	  if	  we	  have	  certain	  practical	  capacities.	  Larry	  clearly	  does	  not	  possess	  the	  practical	  capacities	  that	  would	  be	  required	  to	  follow	  advice	  to	  win	  the	  lottery.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  evaluation	  is	  not	  practical.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  presumably	  purely	  “classificatory,”	  as	  Thomas	  Nagel	  once	  nicely	  put	  it	  (Nagel	  1971,	  p.	  109).	  Thus,	  so	  long	  as	  Larry’s	  winning	  the	  lottery	  constitutes	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  subject-­‐matter	  for	  relevant	  evaluative	  categories	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  it,	  the	  claim	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  win	  the	  lottery	  may	  be	  perfectly	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  to	  positively	  evaluate	  his	  winning	  the	  lottery.	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  lacks	  certain	  practical	  capacities	  is	  neither	  here	  nor	  there.	  	  If	  we	  put	  the	  fitting	  use	  thesis	  and	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  thesis	  together,	  this	  means	  we	  have	  a	  way	  of	  characterizing	  different	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  claims.	  Such	  claims	  differ	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  cases	  of	  prescription	  where	  the	  prescriber	  happens	  to	  lack	  the	  aim	  of	  getting	  the	  prescribee	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act	  by	  heeding	  the	  prescription.	  A	  referee	  offered	  the	  nice	  example	  of	  a	  lawyer	  who	  regards	  herself	  as	  being	  under	  a	  professional	  obligation	  to	  offer	  the	  correct	  advice	  to	  a	  highly	  counter-­‐suggestible	  client,	  even	  though	  she	  knows	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  get	  her	  client	  to	  do	  what	  he	  ought	  is	  to	  advise	  him	  to	  do	  the	  opposite.	  When	  she	  acts	  in	  accordance	  with	  her	  obligation,	  she	  is	  nonetheless	  giving	  advice.	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in	  virtue	  of	  their	  ostensive	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  different	  core	  normative	  practices,	  where	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  a	  normative	  practice	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  having	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  profile	  to	  be	  used	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  the	  practice.	  It	  also	  means	  that	  we	  have	  a	  recipe	  for	  determining	  whether	  particular	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  claims,	  thus	  characterized,	  do	  or	  don’t	  imply	  “feasible.”	  The	  key	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  the	  practice	  and	  the	  profile	  that	  ought	  claims	  must	  possess	  in	  order	  to	  be	  usable	  in	  the	  practice	  to	  achieve	  the	  practice’s	  constitutive	  aim.	  A	  particular	  class	  of	  core-­‐practice	  serving	  ought	  claims	  will	  be	  such	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  just	  in	  case	  being	  usable	  to	  achieve	  the	  practice’s	  constitutive	  aim	  requires	  a	  profile	  that	  includes	  being	  constrained	  by	  what	  is	  feasible.	  	  IV.	  THE	  PRESCRIPTIVE	  OUGHT	  AND	  THE	  EVALUATIVE	  OUGHT	  We	  are	  looking	  for	  some	  pair	  of	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts	  that	  can	  vindicate	  our	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible.	  A	  natural	  thought	  is	  that	  the	  oughts	  we	  need	  are	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  and	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  that	  we	  encountered	  above.15	  As	  Pablo	  Gilabert	  puts	  it,	  claims	  involving	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  and	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  	  have	  a	  different	  relation	  to	  feasibility.	  Prescriptive	  claims	  are,	  and	  evaluative	  claims	  need	  not	  be,	  false	  when	  the	  obligations	  they	  mention	  cannot	  [feasibly]	  be	  fulfilled.	  …	  The	  …	  principle	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  [“feasible”]	  can	  be	  used	  to	  challenge	  prescriptive	  claims:	  since	  they	  take	  feasibility	  constraints	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  what	  they	  demand,	  they	  may	  not	  demand	  what	  [is	  infeasible].	  No	  such	  challenge	  would	  be	  cogent	  with	  respect	  to	  evaluative	  claims	  (Gilabert	  2011,	  p.	  56).16	  	   The	  account	  in	  question	  comprises	  two	  theses.	  The	  first	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  ought	  that	  we	  need	  to	  capture	  our	  sense	  that	  normative	  claims	  are	  false	  in	  virtue	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands,	  and	  that	  insisting	  otherwise	  amounts	  to	  objectionable	  unworldliness,	  is	  the	  
prescriptive	  ought.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  ought	  claims	  involve	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  just	  in	  case	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  prescriber	  in	  
prescription:	  say,	  in	  advising,	  or	  recommending,	  or	  proposing,	  or	  enjoining,	  or	  directing,	  or	  instructing,	  or	  commanding	  the	  agent	  to	  act	  accordingly.	  Let’s	  suppose,	  moreover,	  that	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prescription	  is	  practical:	  to	  get	  the	  agent	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  by	  following	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  An	  account	  of	  this	  kind	  is	  very	  prevalent.	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  least	  implicitly	  endorsed	  in	  some	  form	  or	  other	  by	  many	  political	  theorists,	  including	  Cohen	  2008,	  p.	  251;	  Estlund	  2011,	  pp.	  224-­‐25;	  Gheaus	  2013,	  p.	  457;	  Gilabert	  and	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2012,	  pp.	  818-­‐19;	  Goodin	  and	  Pettit	  1995,	  p.	  1;	  Hamlin	  and	  Stemplowska	  2012,	  pp.	  52-­‐8;	  Mason	  2004,	  pp.	  255-­‐9;	  Pettit	  2012,	  p.	  126;	  Swift	  2008;	  Wiens	  2014.	  16	  Since	  I	  am	  assuming	  an	  interpretation	  of	  “can”	  such	  that	  “can”	  and	  “feasible”	  are	  distinct,	  I	  have	  replaced	  “can”	  with	  “feasible”	  in	  the	  quotation	  to	  avoid	  misunderstanding.	  This	  is	  innocuous.	  As	  Gilabert	  makes	  clear	  elsewhere	  (Gilabert	  forthcoming),	  he	  holds	  that	  “can	  X”	  implies	  “can	  bring	  oneself	  to	  X.”	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advice,	  heeding	  a	  recommendation,	  complying	  with	  a	  directive,	  or	  whatever.	  An	  ought	  claim	  will	  only	  have	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  profile	  to	  be	  usable	  to	  achieve	  this	  practical	  aim	  insofar	  as	  the	  agent	  can	  bring	  herself	  to	  perform	  the	  prescribed	  act.	  So	  it	  follows	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  must	  be	  constrained	  by	  what	  agents	  can	  bring	  themselves	  to	  do	  and,	  hence	  (given	  our	  stipulation),	  by	  what	  it	  is	  feasible	  for	  them	  to	  do.	  We	  therefore	  have	  an	  explanation	  of	  why,	  on	  one	  salient	  interpretation,	  the	  claim	  that	  	  	   (1) The	  Pecunians	  ought	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation	  	  is	  indeed	  false	  on	  account	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible.	  Since	  claims	  involving	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  are	  false	  on	  account	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible,	  (1)	  is	  false	  insofar	  and	  because	  it	  involves	  the	  prescriptive	  ought.	  We	  also	  have	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  insisting	  otherwise	  would	  amount	  to	  objectionable	  unworldliness.	  Insofar	  as	  (1)	  involves	  the	  prescriptive	  ought,	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  prescriber	  in	  advising	  (or	  recommending,	  or	  proposing,	  or	  enjoining,	  or	  directing,	  or	  instructing,	  or	  commanding)	  that	  the	  Pecunians	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation.	  And,	  surely,	  it	  would	  be	  hopelessly	  unworldly	  to	  use	  (1)	  to	  advise	  (or	  recommend,	  or	  propose,	  or	  enjoin,	  or	  direct,	  or	  instruct,	  or	  command)	  the	  Pecunians	  to	  do	  what	  they	  cannot	  bring	  themselves	  to	  do.	  The	  second	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  ought	  we	  need	  to	  capture	  our	  sense	  that	  normative	  claims	  may	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands,	  that	  failing	  to	  act	  accordingly	  would	  be	  to	  do	  wrong,	  and	  that	  insisting	  otherwise	  amounts	  to	  treating	  agents	  unduly	  
leniently,	  is	  the	  evaluative	  ought.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  evaluative	  ought	  claims	  are	  ought	  claims	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  evaluator	  in	  evaluating.	  There	  are	  different	  views	  about	  the	  relevant	  mode	  of	  evaluation.	  One	  view	  holds	  that	  the	  relevant	  mode	  of	  evaluation	  involves	  special	  claims	  about	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  namely	  claims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  agents	  perform	  certain	  acts	  (Gheaus	  2013,	  pp.	  456-­‐7;	  Brennan	  and	  Southwood	  2007,	  pp.	  12-­‐13;	  Chuard	  and	  Southwood	  2009,	  p.	  602).17	  A	  second	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  mode	  of	  evaluation	  involves	  special	  
conditional	  (or	  hypothetical)	  ought	  claims,	  namely	  claims	  about	  what	  agents	  ought	  (e.g.	  in	  the	  prescriptive	  sense)	  to	  do	  if	  it	  is	  (or	  if	  it	  were)	  feasible	  for	  them	  to	  do	  it	  (Gilabert	  2011,	  p.	  56).18	  A	  third	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  mode	  of	  evaluation	  involves	  special	  claims	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  We	  might	  worry	  that	  it	  invites	  circularity	  to	  understand	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  mode	  of	  evaluation	  whose	  content	  itself	  includes	  an	  ought.	  I	  shall	  set	  aside	  this	  worry	  in	  what	  follows.	  18	  A	  referee	  has	  suggested	  that	  it	  seems	  misleading	  to	  describe	  conditional	  or	  hypothetical	  ought	  claims	  as	  involving	  a	  mode	  of	  evaluation	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  say	  that	  Gilabert	  is	  trying	  to	  account	  for	  our	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  make	  infeasible	  demands	  by	  distinguishing	  between	  categorical	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about	  how	  agents	  ought	  to	  be,	  namely	  claims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  agents	  ought	  to	  be	  such	  that	  they	  perform	  certain	  acts.	  Since	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  evaluation	  is	  classificatory,	  rather	  than	  practical	  (see	  Nagel	  1971,	  p.	  109),	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that,	  in	  order	  for	  ought	  claims	  to	  be	  usable	  in	  any	  of	  these	  ways	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  evaluation,	  agents	  must	  be	  able	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  acts	  –	  still	  less	  that	  agents	  are	  able	  to	  bring	  themselves	  to	  do	  so	  –	  and,	  hence,	  no	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  must	  be	  constrained	  by	  what	  is	  feasible.	  So	  we	  also	  have	  an	  explanation	  of	  why,	  on	  a	  different	  salient	  interpretation,	  the	  claim	  that	  	  (1) The	  Pecunians	  ought	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation	  	  might	  indeed	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible.	  Since	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  what	  agents	  can	  bring	  themselves	  to	  do,	  (1)	  might	  very	  well	  be	  true	  insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  evaluative	  ought.	  Have	  we	  found	  the	  account	  we	  need	  to	  vindicate	  our	  ambivalence?	  No.	  Despite	  its	  prevalence	  and	  prima	  facie	  appeal,	  we	  should	  reject	  the	  account.	  Neither	  thesis	  bears	  closer	  scrutiny.	  The	  problem	  with	  the	  first	  thesis	  is	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  may	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible.	  Whether	  claims	  involving	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  are	  false	  on	  account	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible	  turns	  on	  whether	  being	  feasible	  is	  among	  the	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  an	  ought	  claim	  to	  have	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  profile	  to	  be	  usable	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prescription.	  But	  being	  feasible	  is	  not	  among	  these	  conditions.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  case	  of	  Selfish	  Bill.	  Suppose	  that,	  while	  Bill	  is	  unable	  to	  bring	  himself	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish,	  he	  is	  perfectly	  able,	  as	  it	  were,	  to	  be	  brought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  by	  heeding	  the	  prescription	  of	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  prescriber.	  While	  doomed	  to	  dumping	  if	  left	  to	  his	  own	  deliberative	  devices,	  he	  is	  not	  impervious	  to	  a	  judicious	  prescriptive	  intervention	  from	  the	  right	  quarters.	  This	  is	  a	  case	  where	  the	  claim	  that	  Bill	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  is	  perfectly	  usable	  to	  achieve	  the	  aim	  of	  getting	  Bill	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  by	  heeding	  a	  prescription,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  cannot	  bring	  himself	  to	  do	  so.	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  Bill’s	  being	  able	  to	  bring	  himself	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  is	  not	  among	  the	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  to	  be	  usable	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prescription.	  It’s	  just	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  conditional/hypothetical	  oughts.	  While	  sympathetic	  to	  this	  line	  of	  objection,	  I	  shall	  continue	  to	  use	  Gilabert’s	  own	  way	  of	  describing	  his	  position.	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the	  case	  that	  prescriptive	  ought	  claims	  are	  necessarily	  false	  in	  virtue	  of	  demanding	  that	  agents	  do	  what	  they	  cannot	  bring	  themselves	  to	  do.19	  What	  about	  the	  second	  thesis?	  This	  holds	  that	  the	  salient	  ought	  for	  which	  it’s	  false	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  is	  the	  evaluative	  ought.	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that,	  while	  it’s	  surely	  right	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  may	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands,	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  is	  not	  the	  right	  ought	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  our	  reaction	  to	  normative	  claims	  that	  make	  infeasible	  demands	  such	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  Pecunians	  ought	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation.	  The	  interpretation	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  seems	  true	  and	  that	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  vindicate	  is	  one	  according	  to	  which	  the	  Pecunians	  would	  be	  doing	  something	  wrong	  insofar	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation;	  and	  that	  denying	  this	  claim	  would	  amount	  to	  inappropriately	  letting	  them	  off	  the	  hook.	  Recourse	  to	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  can’t	  explain	  this	  (cf	  Wiens	  2014,	  p.	  302).	  Consider,	  first,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  mode	  of	  evaluation	  associated	  with	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  involves	  claims	  that	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  agents	  perform	  certain	  acts.	  At	  most,	  this	  allows	  us	  to	  say	  that,	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  Pecunians	  fail	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation,	  things	  are	  not	  as	  they	  ought	  to	  be;	  that	  the	  world	  has	  fallen	  short	  of	  some	  ideal;	  that	  the	  book	  of	  history	  has	  been	  written	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  presumptively	  a	  cause	  for	  regret.	  All	  that’s	  surely	  true,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  come	  close	  to	  capturing	  our	  sense	  that	  the	  Pecunians	  are	  doing	  something	  wrong.	  Next,	  what	  about	  the	  Gilabert	  proposal	  that	  the	  mode	  of	  evaluation	  associated	  with	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  involves	  claims	  about	  what	  agents	  ought	  (say,	  in	  the	  prescriptive	  sense)	  to	  do	  if	  it	  is	  (or	  if	  it	  were)	  feasible	  for	  them	  to	  do	  it?	  This	  fails	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  At	  most,	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Pecunians	  ought	  (in	  the	  prescriptive	  sense)	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation	  if	  it	  is	  (or	  if	  it	  were)	  feasible	  for	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  Since	  it’s	  not	  feasible	  for	  the	  Pecunians	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  they	  are	  not	  doing	  anything	  
wrong	  in	  failing	  to	  do	  so.	  It	  might	  be	  said	  that	  they	  are	  doing	  something	  wrong	  in	  the	  evaluative	  sense.	  But	  this	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  nothing	  over	  above	  doing	  a	  conditional	  or	  hypothetical	  wrong	  (in	  the	  prescriptive	  sense).	  Finally,	  what	  about	  the	  view	  that	  the	  mode	  of	  evaluation	  associated	  with	  claims	  involving	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  involves	  claims	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  agents	  ought	  to	  be	  such	  that	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  Doesn’t	  being	  able	  to	  heed	  a	  prescription	  imply	  being	  able	  to	  bring	  oneself	  to	  act	  in	  the	  prescribed	  way?	  No.	  Whereas	  being	  able	  to	  bring	  oneself	  to	  act	  implies	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  perform	  the	  act,	  being	  able	  to	  heed	  a	  prescription	  to	  perform	  some	  act	  does	  not	  require	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  perform	  the	  act.	  It	  is	  enough	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  the	  prescriber	  
believes	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  do	  so.	  Recognizing	  that	  a	  suitably	  situated	  other	  agent	  believes	  that	  this	  is	  what	  one	  ought	  to	  do	  (and	  perhaps	  having	  this	  belief	  communicated	  via	  a	  prescriptive	  intervention)	  might	  have	  the	  necessary	  oomph	  to	  motivate	  one	  where	  one’s	  own	  belief	  does	  not.	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they	  perform	  certain	  acts?	  This	  is	  more	  promising.	  Inasmuch	  as	  the	  Pecunians	  are	  not	  such	  that	  they	  work	  at	  the	  same	  level	  of	  intensity	  for	  less	  pecuniary	  gain,	  we	  can	  say	  something	  more	  than	  that	  things	  are	  not	  as	  they	  ought	  to	  be.	  In	  addition,	  we	  can	  hold	  that	  the	  Pecunians	  have	  gone	  wrong	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  have	  failed	  to	  be	  as	  they	  ought	  to	  be.	  Moreover,	  we	  are	  not	  forced	  to	  make	  this	  assessment	  conditional	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  feasible	  for	  the	  Pecunians	  to	  work	  at	  the	  same	  level	  of	  intensity	  for	  less	  pecuniary	  gain	  –	  indeed,	  assuming	  that	  “ought	  to	  be”	  doesn’t	  imply	  “feasible	  to	  be,”	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  feasible	  for	  the	  Pecunians	  to	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that	  they	  are	  such	  that	  they	  work	  at	  the	  same	  level	  of	  intensity	  for	  less	  pecuniary	  gain.	  Still,	  such	  an	  account	  cannot	  fully	  capture	  our	  adverse	  reaction.	  Let’s	  concede	  the	  Pecunians	  ought	  to	  be	  such	  that	  they	  work	  at	  the	  same	  level	  of	  intensity	  for	  less	  pecuniary	  gain.	  They	  ought	  to	  be	  otherwise	  than	  they	  are:	  less	  selfish,	  less	  materialistic,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  does	  this	  really	  exhaust	  their	  normative	  failings?	  Does	  pointing	  out	  their	  failings	  of	  character	  really	  make	  the	  thought	  that	  there	  is	  no	  failing	  of	  conduct	  any	  less	  misguided?	  Surely	  not.	  Our	  assessment	  that	  the	  Pecunians	  are	  failing	  to	  do	  what	  they	  ought	  to	  do	  does	  not	  simply	  evaporate	  once	  we	  acknowledge	  that	  they	  are	  failing	  to	  be	  as	  they	  ought	  to	  be.	  To	  capture	  adequately	  our	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  make	  infeasible	  demands,	  a	  different	  pair	  of	  oughts	  is	  required.	  	  V.	  THE	  DELIBERATIVE	  OUGHT	  What	  kind	  of	  ought	  might	  be	  capable	  of	  vindicating	  our	  sense	  that	  normative	  claims	  are	  necessarily	  false	  in	  virtue	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands	  and	  that	  insisting	  otherwise	  amounts	  to	  objectionable	  unworldliness?	  The	  oughts	  we	  have	  encountered	  so	  far	  –	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  and	  the	  evaluative	  ought	  –	  are	  not	  up	  to	  the	  task.	  I	  shall	  now	  argue	  that	  the	  ought	  we	  need	  is	  what	  I	  shall	  call	  the	  deliberative	  ought.	  Deliberative	  ought	  claims	  are	  ought	  claims	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practices	  of	  (practical)	  deliberation.	  To	  get	  a	  flavor	  of	  the	  deliberative	  ought,	  return	  again	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Luckless	  Larry.	  Suppose	  that	  Larry	  is	  contemplating	  his	  ghastly	  predicament	  and	  planning	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  unenviable	  life.	  Suppose	  that	  in	  the	  course	  of	  doing	  so	  he	  concludes	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  win	  the	  lottery.	  His	  judgment	  involves	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  in	  the	  sense	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  just	  in	  case	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation.	  Following	  R.	  Jay	  Wallace,	  let’s	  say	  that	  practical	  deliberation	  involves	  “resolving	  [or	  settling]	  the	  question	  of	  what	  one	  is	  to	  do”	  (see	  Wallace	  2014,	  p.	  1).20	  Moreover,	  let’s	  say	  that	  for	  Larry	  to	  use	  the	  claim	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  win	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  I	  shall	  remain	  relatively	  neutral	  concerning	  exactly	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  question.	  All	  that	  I	  shall	  assume	  is	  that,	  whatever	  the	  right	  way	  to	  understand	  it,	  we	  settle	  it	  by	  making	  a	  decision	  (see	  also	  Wallace	  2014,	  p.	  1).	  So,	  for	  example,	  to	  engage	  in	  practical	  deliberation,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  engage	  in	  some	  purely	  doxastic	  activity	  that	  merely	  involves	  undertaking	  to	  form	  normative	  or	  non-­‐normative	  beliefs,	  insofar	  as	  these	  beliefs	  fail	  to	  entail	  corresponding	  decisions.	  Rather,	  one	  must	  be	  engaged	  in	  a	  process	  that	  involves	  undertaking	  to	  make	  a	  decision.	  This	  leaves	  open	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  views.	  The	  view	  I	  myself	  like	  holds	  that	  the	  question	  of	  what	  we	  are	  to	  do	  is	  a	  special	  sui	  generis	  practical	  question	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  both	  the	  question	  of	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  and	  the	  question	  of	  what	  we	  will	  do	  (see	  Hieronymi	  2009;	  2011;	  Southwood	  2016;	  forthcoming.	  But	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the	  lottery	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  would	  be	  for	  him	  to	  treat	  the	  claim	  as	  decisive	  in	  settling	  the	  question	  of	  what	  he	  is	  to	  do:	  that	  is,	  to	  decide	  to	  win	  the	  lottery	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  this	  is	  what	  (or	  so	  he	  believes)	  he	  ought	  to	  do	  (see	  also	  Schroeder	  2011).	  The	  claim	  that	  Larry	  ought	  to	  win	  the	  lottery	  seems	  plainly	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  way	  and,	  hence,	  false	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation.	  Since	  claims	  about	  what	  we	  deliberatively	  ought	  to	  do	  are	  ought	  claims	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  –	  and	  whose	  truth	  depends	  on	  whether	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  –	  it	  follows	  that	  Larry’s	  judgment	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  win	  the	  lottery	  is	  false	  insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  deliberative	  ought.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  I	  take	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  to	  be	  crucially	  distinct	  from	  the	  prescriptive	  ought.	  Whereas	  prescriptive	  ought	  claims	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practices	  of	  prescription,	  deliberative	  ought	  claims	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practices	  of	  deliberation.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  number	  of	  philosophers	  take	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  to	  encompass	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  (e.g.	  Smith	  1994,	  p.	  151;	  Schroeder	  2011;	  Kiesewetter	  forthcoming,	  ch.	  1).21	  Call	  this	  the	  assimilationist	  view.	  In	  my	  terminology,	  the	  assimilationist	  view	  holds	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  are	  supposed	  to	  fit	  to	  be	  used,	  not	  only	  in	  deliberation,	  but	  also	  in	  prescription.	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  of	  interpreting	  the	  assimilationist	  view.	  One	  is	  disjunctive.	  The	  disjunctive	  interpretation	  holds	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  are	  only	  true	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  fit	  to	  play	  at	  least	  one	  of	  
these	  roles.	  The	  other	  is	  conjunctive.	  The	  conjunctive	  interpretation	  holds	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  are	  only	  true	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  fit	  to	  play	  both	  roles.	  Here	  is	  a	  quick	  argument	  against	  the	  assimilationist	  view	  –	  in	  either	  interpretation.	  First,	  while	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  and	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription	  will	  typically	  overlap,	  they	  may	  also	  come	  apart.	  I	  will	  argue	  shortly	  that	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  requires	  being	  constrained	  by	  what	  is	  feasible.	  Since	  I	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  that	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription	  does	  not	  require	  being	  constrained	  by	  what	  is	  feasible,	  it	  follows	  that	  an	  ought	  claim	  that	  demands	  the	  infeasible	  may	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription	  despite	  being	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation.	  It	  is	  also	  plausible	  that	  they	  come	  apart	  in	  the	  other	  direction.	  That	  is,	  an	  ought	  claim	  may	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  but	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription.	  (Suppose	  that	  while	  an	  agent	  has	  all	  the	  capacities	  required	  to	  use	  the	  claim	  in	  deliberation,	  she	  has	  some	  pathological	  incapacity	  to	  follow	  advice.)	  Second,	  if	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  and	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription	  may	  come	  apart	  in	  both	  directions,	  then	  both	  the	  disjunctive	  and	  conjunctive	  interpretations	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  one	  might	  instead	  hold	  that	  it	  is	  simply	  the	  question	  of	  what	  one	  ought	  to	  do	  (Scanlon	  1998)	  or	  the	  question	  of	  what	  one	  will	  (or	  what	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  one	  to)	  do	  (Harman	  1975;	  Velleman	  2000;	  Wallace	  2001)	  –	  perhaps	  under	  a	  special	  practical	  “mode	  of	  presentation.”	  I	  am	  very	  grateful	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  persuading	  me	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  neutrality	  on	  this	  point.	  21	  Schroeder	  (2011)	  and	  Kiesewetter	  (forthcoming)	  also	  appear	  to	  take	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  to	  encompass	  the	  
hypological	  ought.	  Again,	  I	  take	  them	  to	  be	  importantly	  distinct.	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assimilationist	  view	  have	  implausible	  implications.	  Take	  an	  ought	  claim	  that	  is	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription	  but	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  disjunctive	  interpretation	  implies	  that	  the	  claim	  is	  true	  insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  deliberative	  ought,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  not	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation.	  That	  seems	  clearly	  wrong.	  Next,	  take	  an	  ought	  claim	  that	  is	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  but	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prescription.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  conjunctive	  interpretation	  implies	  that	  the	  claim	  is	  false	  insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  deliberative	  ought.	  Again,	  this	  seems	  clearly	  wrong.	  To	  avoid	  such	  implications	  we	  should	  keep	  the	  deliberative	  and	  prescriptive	  ought	  firmly	  apart,	  as	  I	  shall	  do	  in	  what	  follows.	  Might	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  be	  the	  ought	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  to	  vindicate	  our	  sense	  that	  ought	  claims	  are	  necessarily	  false	  in	  virtue	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible?	  Given	  that	  1)	  claims	  about	  what	  we	  deliberatively	  ought	  to	  do	  are	  ought	  claims	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  and	  2)	  ought	  claims	  are	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  deliberation	  just	  in	  case	  they	  are	  usable	  in	  deliberation	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  deliberation,	  the	  crucial	  question	  for	  our	  purposes	  is:	  What	  is	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation?	  In	  particular,	  must	  an	  ought	  claim	  be	  constrained	  by	  what	  is	  feasible	  to	  be	  usable	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  to	  achieve	  its	  constitutive	  aim?	  I	  suggest	  that	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation	  is	  to	  
determine	  how	  we	  will	  act	  by	  deciding	  how	  to	  act	  (cf	  Katsafanas	  2011,	  pp.	  120-­‐24).22	  This	  has	  three	  elements.	  First,	  it	  has	  a	  practical	  element;	  it	  encompasses	  action.	  In	  engaging	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  –	  say,	  about	  whether	  to	  pat	  a	  little	  kangaroo	  who	  is	  eating	  grass	  in	  my	  front	  yard	  –	  part	  of	  my	  aim	  must	  be	  precisely	  to	  determine	  I	  will	  act:	  whether	  I	  will	  perform	  the	  act	  of	  patting	  the	  kangaroo,	  or	  whether	  I	  will	  refrain	  from	  performing	  that	  act.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  will	  in	  fact	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  my	  decision	  (insofar	  as	  I	  make	  a	  decision	  at	  all).	  I	  might	  decide	  to	  pat	  the	  kangaroo	  and	  then	  be	  thwarted	  by	  the	  world	  (the	  kangaroo	  runs	  away	  before	  I	  can	  pat	  him);	  or	  by	  another	  agent	  (who	  physically	  prevents	  me	  from	  patting	  him);	  or	  by	  my	  own	  laziness	  or	  incontinence.	  I	  might	  change	  my	  mind.	  (“On	  second	  thoughts,	  those	  claws	  look	  rather	  sharp.”)	  Nor	  does	  it	  mean	  that	  if	  I	  do	  succeed	  in	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  my	  decision,	  my	  action	  constitutes	  part	  of	  my	  deliberation,	  an	  idea	  that	  Aristotle	  is	  sometimes	  accused	  of	  having	  advocated.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  my	  aim	  must	  be	  to	  determine	  how	  I	  will	  act.	  Suppose	  that	  my	  aim	  is	  simply	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  without	  aiming	  to	  act	  as	  I	  decide	  –	  say,	  because	  I	  have	  been	  offered	  a	  substantial	  prize	  to	  make	  a	  
decision	  to	  pat	  the	  kangaroo	  even	  though	  patting	  him	  will	  result	  in	  something	  extremely	  unpleasant,	  such	  as	  getting	  badly	  bitten	  or	  clawed	  (see	  Kavka	  1983).	  This	  may	  well	  be	  possible.	  But	  it	  isn’t	  practical	  deliberation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  I	  don’t	  say	  that	  this	  is	  all	  that	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation	  involves.	  Plausibly,	  it	  also	  has	  some	  kind	  of	  reason-­‐responsive	  aspect.	  However,	  I	  won’t	  say	  anything	  about	  what	  kind	  of	  reason-­‐responsiveness	  (if	  any)	  is	  required	  here.	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Second,	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation	  has	  a	  decisional	  element;	  it	  encompasses	  making	  a	  decision	  (see	  Gibbard	  2003;	  Southwood	  2010,	  ch.	  4).	  Clearly,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  engage	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  without	  in	  fact	  making	  a	  decision.	  I	  might	  deliberate	  about	  whether	  to	  pat	  the	  kangaroo	  and	  fail	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  either	  way.	  (“It’s	  very	  cute.	  But	  those	  claws	  also	  look	  pretty	  nasty.	  Ah,	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  to	  do.”)	  But	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  engage	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  without	  having	  the	  aim	  of	  making	  a	  decision.	  Suppose	  that,	  like	  Lafcadio	  (André	  Gide’s	  dubious	  protagonist	  in	  Les	  Caves	  du	  Vatican),	  I	  have	  the	  aim	  of	  performing	  a	  purely	  spontaneous	  (or	  unmotivated)	  action	  and	  act	  in	  pursuit	  of	  that	  aim.	  Even	  if	  this	  is	  possible,	  it’s	  not	  practical	  deliberation.	  Or	  suppose	  that	  I	  am	  engaging	  in	  purely	  speculative	  reflection	  about	  whether	  I	  ought	  to	  pat	  the	  kangaroo,	  without	  any	  thought	  of	  making	  a	  decision.	  (Perhaps	  I	  have	  already	  decided	  to	  pat	  the	  kangaroo	  and	  am	  not	  reopening	  the	  issue.)	  Again,	  this	  does	  not	  count	  as	  practical	  deliberation	  in	  the	  sense	  I	  have	  in	  mind.	  	  Third,	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation	  has	  an	  authorial	  element;	  it	  encompasses	  a	  special	  relation	  of	  authorship	  between	  our	  decisions	  and	  our	  actions.	  In	  deliberating	  about	  what	  to	  do,	  we	  do	  not	  merely	  aim	  to	  determine	  how	  we	  will	  act	  and	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  act.	  Rather,	  we	  aim	  to	  determine	  how	  we	  will	  act	  by	  deciding	  how	  to	  act.	  Our	  aim,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  for	  our	  decisions	  (whatever	  they	  are)	  to	  determine	  how	  we	  act	  (see	  Katsafanas	  2011).	  Here,	  too,	  this	  relation	  will	  clearly	  not	  always	  obtain.	  Even	  when	  we	  succeed	  in	  making	  a	  decision	  (say,	  to	  pat	  the	  kangaroo)	  and	  doing	  as	  we	  decide	  (patting	  the	  kangaroo),	  we	  may	  not	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  decision	  but,	  rather,	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  appearing	  cowardly,	  or	  because	  someone	  with	  an	  authoritative	  bearing	  commands	  us	  to	  pat	  the	  kangaroo,	  or	  whatever.	  Still,	  at	  least	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation	  is	  for	  our	  decisions	  to	  determine	  how	  we	  will	  act.	  Any	  activity	  in	  which	  this	  feature	  is	  lacking	  from	  our	  aim	  falls	  short	  of	  practical	  deliberation.	  Or	  so	  I	  shall	  assume.	  Suppose	  that	  I	  am	  right	  that	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation	  includes	  determining	  how	  we	  will	  act	  by	  deciding	  how	  to	  act.	  What	  kind	  of	  agential	  profile	  must	  an	  ought	  claim	  (to	  the	  effect	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  perform	  some	  act)	  possess	  to	  be	  usable	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  to	  achieve	  this	  constitutive	  aim?	  In	  particular,	  what	  kinds	  of	  capacities	  must	  we	  possess?	  First,	  it	  must	  be	  a	  claim	  such	  that	  one	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  perform	  the	  act.	  Consider	  the	  claim	  that	  	  	   (8) I	  ought	  to	  play	  the	  Scarbo	  movement	  from	  Ravel’s	  Gaspard	  de	  la	  nuit	  this	  evening.	  	  Suppose	  that	  I	  am	  an	  incurably	  mediocre	  pianist	  who	  is	  unable	  to	  play	  Chopsticks,	  let	  alone	  a	  piece	  as	  difficult	  as	  Gaspard	  de	  la	  nuit.	  In	  this	  case	  (8)	  is	  clearly	  not	  usable	  to	  achieve	  the	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aim	  of	  determining	  how	  I	  will	  act,	  still	  less	  the	  aim	  of	  determining	  how	  I	  will	  act	  by	  deciding	  how	  to	  act.	  Second,	  the	  claim	  must	  be	  a	  claim	  such	  that	  one	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  this	  is	  what	  (or	  so	  one	  believes)	  one	  ought	  to	  do.	  Suppose	  that	  one	  is	  an	  impoverished	  but	  besotted	  parent	  who	  is	  confronted	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  giving	  up	  a	  beloved	  child	  for	  adoption	  into	  a	  wealthy	  family.	  Now	  consider	  the	  claim	  that	  	   (9) I	  ought	  to	  give	  up	  my	  child	  for	  adoption.	  	  To	  use	  an	  ought	  claim	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  is	  to	  treat	  it	  as	  decisive	  in	  settling	  the	  question	  of	  what	  one	  is	  to	  do,	  that	  is,	  to	  decide	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  this	  is	  what	  (or	  so	  one	  believes)	  one	  ought	  to	  do.	  But	  suppose	  that	  one	  is	  simply	  incapable,	  even	  insofar	  as	  one	  believes	  that	  this	  is	  what	  one	  ought	  to	  do,	  of	  deciding	  to	  give	  up	  one’s	  child	  for	  adoption	  on	  that	  basis.	  In	  that	  case,	  (9)	  is	  not	  usable	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  at	  all,	  still	  less	  usable	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation.	  Third,	  the	  claim	  must	  also	  be	  such	  that	  one	  has	  the	  further	  capacities	  required	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act	  by	  deciding	  to	  perform	  it:	  i.e.	  the	  capacity	  to	  activate	  one’s	  decision	  by	  trying;	  and	  the	  capacity	  not	  to	  give	  up	  trying.	  Suppose	  that	  my	  friend	  is	  drowning	  while	  an	  enormous	  shark	  cruises	  ominously	  between	  the	  shore	  and	  my	  drowning	  friend.	  Consider	  the	  claim	  that	  	   (10) I	  ought	  to	  save	  my	  drowning	  friend.	  	  Suppose	  that	  I	  am	  capable	  of	  deciding	  to	  save	  my	  friend	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  this	  is	  what	  (or	  so	  I	  believe)	  I	  ought	  to	  do,	  and	  even	  able	  to	  save	  her	  (were	  I	  to	  try	  and	  not	  give	  up	  I	  would	  be	  virtually	  certain	  to	  succeed).	  But	  suppose	  that	  I	  have	  a	  terrible	  case	  of	  selachophobia	  in	  consequence	  of	  which	  I	  am	  incapable	  of	  activating	  the	  decision	  by	  trying,	  or	  incapable	  of	  avoiding	  giving	  up	  trying.	  My	  selachophobia	  constitutes	  an	  insurmountable	  impediment,	  not	  to	  my	  deciding	  to	  save	  my	  friend	  or	  indeed	  to	  saving	  my	  friend	  but	  to	  saving	  my	  friend	  by	  deciding	  to	  save	  her.	  Once	  again,	  this	  means	  that	  (10)	  is	  not	  usable	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation,	  namely	  to	  determine	  how	  I	  will	  act	  by	  deciding	  what	  I	  am	  to	  do.	  So,	  in	  order	  for	  an	  ought	  claim	  (to	  the	  effect	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  perform	  some	  act)	  to	  be	  usable	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation,	  one	  must	  possess	  i)	  the	  ability	  to	  perform	  the	  act,	  ii)	  the	  capacity	  to	  decide	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  one	  ought	  to	  perform	  it,	  iii)	  the	  capacity	  to	  try	  to	  perform	  the	  act,	  and	  iv)	  the	  capacity	  not	  to	  give	  up	  trying	  to	  perform	  the	  act.	  But,	  of	  course,	  these	  just	  are	  the	  capacities	  that	  are	  required	  in	  order	  for	  one	  to	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  oneself	  to	  perform	  an	  act	  –	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and	  hence,	  given	  our	  stipulation	  that	  feasibility	  is	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  what	  we	  can	  bring	  ourselves	  to	  do,	  that	  are	  required	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  feasible	  for	  one	  to	  perform	  the	  act.	  So,	  being	  constrained	  by	  what	  is	  feasible	  is	  indeed	  part	  of	  the	  profile	  that	  ought	  claims	  must	  possess	  in	  order	  to	  be	  usable	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  to	  achieve	  its	  constitutive	  aim.	  Given	  that	  deliberative	  ought	  claims	  just	  are	  ought	  claims	  whose	  truth	  depends	  on	  their	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practical	  deliberation,	  and	  the	  fitness	  of	  ought	  claims	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  usable	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  to	  achieve	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  practical	  deliberation,	  it	  follows	  that	  deliberative	  ought	  claims	  are	  ought	  claims	  whose	  truth	  depends,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  on	  whether	  they	  make	  feasible	  demands.	  Let	  me	  briefly	  consider	  two	  important	  objections.23	  The	  first	  objection	  is	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  “deliberative	  ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  entails	  an	  implausible	  account	  of	  practical	  deliberation.	  Suppose	  that	  Selfish	  Bill	  is	  deliberating	  about	  whether	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  And	  suppose	  that	  he	  deliberates	  as	  follows:	  “I	  am	  not	  disposed	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to	  decide	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  my	  rubbish	  insofar	  as	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  my	  rubbish.	  It	  is	  feasible	  for	  me	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  my	  rubbish	  only	  if	  I	  am	  disposed	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to	  decide	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  my	  rubbish	  insofar	  as	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  my	  rubbish.	  So,	  it’s	  not	  feasible	  for	  me	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  my	  rubbish.	  Since	  claims	  involving	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  imply	  “feasible,”	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  I	  deliberatively	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  my	  rubbish.”	  If	  I’m	  right	  that	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  is	  such	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible,”	  then	  it	  seems	  to	  follow	  that	  Bill	  could	  indeed	  deliberate	  in	  this	  way.	  But	  it	  would	  not	  be	  appropriate	  for	  Bill	  to	  deliberate	  in	  this	  way.	  So	  it	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  (as	  I	  have	  characterized	  it)	  are	  constrained	  by	  what	  is	  feasible.	  In	  order	  to	  evaluate	  this	  objection	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  two	  issues.	  One	  issue	  concerns	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  deliberator	  such	  as	  Bill	  to	  discover	  the	  falsity	  of	  an	  ought	  claim	  simply	  by	  recognizing	  that	  he	  is	  not	  disposed	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to	  decide	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  it	  insofar	  as	  he	  believes	  the	  claim?	  Let’s	  say	  that	  I	  am	  committed	  to	  saying	  that	  this	  is	  indeed	  possible.24	  Is	  this	  a	  problem?	  It	  would	  certainly	  be	  a	  problem	  if	  I	  were	  committed	  to	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  Bill	  to	  discover	  that	  he	  does	  nothing	  wrong	  in	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  Fortunately,	  I	  am	  not	  committed	  to	  that.	  Indeed,	  the	  argument	  in	  the	  next	  section	  will	  be	  precisely	  that	  there	  is	  another	  salient	  ought	  –	  the	  hypological	  ought	  –	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  such	  sound	  argument	  by	  which	  Bill	  might	  arrive	  at	  the	  conclusion	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  I	  am	  very	  grateful	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  raising	  these	  objections.	  24	  Even	  this	  is	  not	  quite	  right.	  My	  endorsement	  of	  (4)	  was	  avowedly	  “tentative.”	  I	  am	  open	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  we	  should	  replace	  (4)	  with	  something	  weaker	  like	  	   (4’)	   An	  agent	  A	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  rationally	  decide	  to	  X	  only	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  A	  is	  (robustly)	  disposed,	  insofar	  as	  A	  believes	  that	  she	  ought	  to	  X,	  not	  to	  (be	  sufficiently	  likely	  to)	  decide	  to	  X	  (on	  the	  basis	  of	  believing	  that	  she	  ought	  to	  X).	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that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  Rather,	  I	  am	  committed	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  Bill	  to	  discover	  the	  falsity	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  he	  
deliberatively	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  right	  result.	  Deliberative	  ought	  claims	  are	  distinguished	  precisely	  by	  their	  ostensive	  fitness	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  If	  Bill	  discovers	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  lacks	  some	  important	  feature	  that	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practical	  deliberation,	  we	  should	  surely	  expect	  it	  to	  be	  possible	  for	  him	  to	  discover	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  he	  deliberative	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  The	  other	  issue	  concerns	  whether	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  use	  the	  principle	  that	  “deliberative	  ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  within	  practical	  deliberation.	  I	  am	  not	  committed	  to	  saying	  that	  this	  is	  appropriate;	  I	  simply	  don’t	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  the	  issue.	  My	  aim	  has	  been	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  the	  deliberative	  ought.	  According	  to	  this	  account,	  an	  ought	  claim	  involves	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  just	  in	  case	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  I	  have	  given	  some	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  what	  it	  takes	  for	  an	  ought	  claim	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  The	  claim	  that	  Bill	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  violates	  one	  of	  these	  necessary	  conditions.	  But	  I	  do	  not	  purport	  to	  have	  given	  an	  account	  of	  what	  it	  takes	  for	  practical	  deliberation	  to	  be	  appropriate	  or	  inappropriate.	  In	  particular,	  I	  have	  said	  nothing	  at	  all	  about	  how	  (or	  indeed	  whether)	  it	  is	  appropriate	  for	  a	  deliberator’s	  beliefs	  about	  feasibility	  (or	  its	  constituents)	  to	  enter	  into	  practical	  deliberation.	  For	  all	  I	  have	  said,	  it	  may	  well	  be	  entirely	  inappropriate	  for	  Bill	  to	  deliberate	  by	  explicitly	  using	  the	  principle	  that	  “deliberative	  ought”	  implies	  “feasible.”	  Wouldn’t	  there	  be	  something	  inconsistent	  or	  paradoxical	  about,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  insisting	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  this	  principle	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  denying	  that	  it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  for	  a	  deliberator	  to	  employ	  it	  in	  practical	  deliberation?	  No	  more	  so	  than	  there	  is	  something	  inconsistent	  or	  paradoxical	  about	  a	  consequentialist	  denying	  that	  it	  would	  be	  appropriate	  to	  employ	  consequentialism	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  Of	  course,	  it	  would	  be	  nice	  to	  have	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  it	  might	  be	  inappropriate	  for	  a	  deliberator	  to	  employ	  the	  principle	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  –	  if	  indeed	  it	  is	  inappropriate.	  Such	  an	  explanation	  lies	  beyond	  the	  ambition	  of	  the	  current	  paper.	  But	  there	  are	  various	  possibilities.	  One	  possibility	  is	  the	  distinctively	  Kantian	  idea	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  conducted	  under	  “the	  idea	  of	  freedom,”	  practical	  deliberation	  must	  be	  conducted	  in	  complete	  isolation	  from	  our	  beliefs	  about	  what	  is	  feasible	  (Kant	  1998,	  ch.	  3).	  Another	  (less	  drastic)	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  role	  of	  feasibility	  assessments	  with	  regard	  to	  appropriate	  practical	  deliberation	  is	  restricted	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  agenda-­‐setting	  role.	  Appropriately	  responding	  to	  our	  assessments	  about	  what	  is	  feasibility	  requires	  engaging	  (or	  continuing	  to	  engage)	  in	  practical	  deliberation	  concerning	  only	  those	  acts	  that	  we	  take	  to	  be	  feasible	  (or	  that	  we	  don’t	  take	  to	  be	  infeasible).	  But	  it	  does	  not	  permit	  us	  to	  arrive	  at	  normative	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  assessments	  about	  what	  is	  infeasible	  within	  deliberative	  decision-­‐making.	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Apart	  from	  these	  brief	  and	  speculative	  remarks,	  I	  am	  afraid	  that	  I	  must	  leave	  the	  question	  of	  exactly	  what	  role	  feasibility	  assessments	  should	  play	  within	  (or	  with	  regard	  to)	  practical	  deliberation	  for	  another	  occasion.	  The	  second	  objection	  is	  that	  even	  if	  I	  am	  right	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  are	  false	  on	  account	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands,	  recourse	  to	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  cannot	  offer	  an	  explanation	  of	  our	  sense	  that	  normative	  claims	  are	  false	  on	  account	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands	  outside	  first-­‐personal	  deliberative	  contexts.	  It’s	  one	  thing	  to	  say	  that	  if	  Bill	  judges	  that	  he	  (Bill)	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish,	  then	  his	  judgment	  is	  false	  insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  deliberative	  ought.	  But,	  suppose,	  instead,	  that	  Bill’s	  neighbor,	  Sheila,	  judges	  that	  Bill	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  Sheila’s	  judgment	  cannot	  involve	  the	  deliberative	  ought.	  Deliberation	  is	  essentially	  first-­‐personal	  (see	  Owens	  2011).	  Barring	  very	  special	  circumstances,	  we	  cannot	  deliberate	  on	  behalf	  of	  others.	  We	  can	  deliberate	  as	  if	  we	  are	  others.	  We	  can	  deliberate	  about	  how	  to	  advise	  others	  or	  what	  to	  make	  them	  do	  (by	  force	  or	  persuasion).	  But	  we	  cannot	  engage	  in	  the	  distinctively	  deliberative	  activity	  of	  settling	  the	  question	  of	  how	  others	  are	  to	  behave	  (Southwood	  2016).	  This	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  simply	  impossible	  for	  third-­‐personal	  normative	  judgments	  such	  as	  Sheila’s	  to	  involve	  the	  deliberative	  ought.	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  appealing	  to	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  cannot	  explain	  how	  such	  judgments	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  false	  on	  account	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands;	  hence,	  our	  account	  is	  crucially	  incomplete.	  Fortunately,	  however,	  it’s	  not	  right.	  Recall	  that	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  ought	  claims	  are	  ought	  claims	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  a	  relevant	  canonical	  executor	  of	  the	  canonical	  task	  associated	  with	  the	  relevant	  core	  normative	  practice.	  The	  canonical	  executor	  of	  the	  canonical	  task	  associated	  with	  our	  deliberative	  practices	  is	  the	  agent	  whose	  conduct	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  deliberation.	  Since	  Sheila	  is	  not	  the	  agent	  of	  Bill’s	  conduct,	  she	  cannot	  
herself	  use	  the	  claim	  that	  Bill	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  Nor	  is	  it	  plausible	  to	  suppose	  that	  her	  judgment	  involves	  an	  ought	  claim	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  her	  (Sheila)	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  What	  she	  can	  do,	  however,	  is	  make	  a	  normative	  judgment	  that	  involves	  an	  ought	  claim	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  the	  agent	  (i.e.	  Bill)	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  That	  is	  enough	  in	  order	  for	  her	  judgment	  to	  involve	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  in	  the	  sense	  I	  have	  in	  mind.	  Isn’t	  there	  something	  odd	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  may	  make	  normative	  judgments	  that	  involve	  ought	  claims	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  other	  agents?	  Not	  at	  all.	  We	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  this	  is	  true	  of	  first-­‐personal	  prescriptive	  ought	  judgments,	  as	  when	  Watson’s	  cantankerous	  squash-­‐player	  judges	  that	  she	  ought	  not	  to	  go	  and	  shake	  her	  opponent’s	  hand.	  Such	  judgments	  involve	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  prescriber	  in	  prescribing.	  Assuming	  that	  prescription	  is	  essentially	  second-­‐personal,	  this	  will	  have	  to	  be	  another	  agent.	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I	  take	  it	  that	  there	  is	  no	  oddity	  here.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  our	  talk	  and	  thought	  involving	  the	  prescriptive	  ought	  often	  reflects	  our	  concern	  with	  whether	  certain	  conduct	  is	  advisable	  or	  
unadvisable	  –	  a	  concern	  that	  encompasses	  our	  own	  conduct	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  others.	  Similarly,	  our	  talk	  and	  thought	  involving	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  reflects	  our	  concern	  with	  whether	  certain	  conduct	  is,	  as	  we	  might	  put	  it,	  deliberatively	  choice-­‐worthy	  or	  non-­‐choice-­‐
worthy.	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  this	  concern	  extends	  to	  others’	  conduct	  as	  well	  as	  our	  own	  (see	  Jackson	  1991,	  pp.	  462-­‐63).	  So	  we	  appear	  to	  have	  found	  an	  ought	  for	  which	  it	  is	  true	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible.”	  Is	  it	  the	  right	  ought	  to	  vindicate	  the	  first	  part	  of	  our	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible?	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  it	  is.	  Consider	  again	  the	  claim	  that	  	   (1) The	  Pecunians	  ought	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation.	  	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  (1)	  that	  seems	  straightforwardly	  false	  –	  and	  for	  which	  insisting	  otherwise	  seems	  objectionably	  unworldly	  –	  is	  precisely	  an	  interpretation	  of	  (1)	  that	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  Insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  deliberative	  ought,	  to	  insist	  upon	  the	  truth	  of	  (1)	  would	  be	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  claiming	  that	  (1)	  is	  fit	  to	  be	  treated	  by	  the	  Pecunians	  as	  decisive	  in	  settling	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation.	  But	  this	  would	  be	  to	  insist	  that	  (1)	  is	  fit	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  decisive	  in	  settling	  the	  question	  of	  what	  they	  are	  to	  do	  in	  favor	  of	  doing	  what	  they	  cannot	  bring	  themselves	  to	  do	  –	  surely	  the	  very	  epitome	  of	  unworldliness.	  	  VI.	  THE	  HYPOLOGICAL	  OUGHT	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  is	  the	  ought	  we	  need	  to	  explain	  the	  first	  part	  of	  our	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible.	  The	  remaining	  task	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  ought	  that	  can	  explain	  the	  second	  part	  of	  our	  ambivalence:	  our	  sense	  that	  such	  claims	  may	  also	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands,	  and	  that	  insisting	  otherwise	  amounts	  to	  treating	  agents	  unduly	  leniently,	  or	  mistakenly	  letting	  them	  off	  the	  
hook.	  My	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  ought	  we	  need	  for	  this	  purpose	  is	  the	  hypological	  ought	  (cf	  Zimmerman	  2006).	  Claims	  involving	  the	  hypological	  ought	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  operating	  in	  the	  service	  of	  our	  hypological	  practices:	  our	  practices	  of	  directing	  criticism	  toward	  others	  and	  ourselves.25	  More	  precisely,	  I	  shall	  understand	  claims	  about	  what	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  the	  hypological	  ought	  is	  simply	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  evaluative	  ought?	  While	  the	  labels	  don’t	  especially	  matter,	  I	  believe	  this	  would	  be	  a	  mistake.	  That’s	  because	  the	  various	  different	  core	  normative	  practices	  are	  defined,	  in	  part,	  by	  their	  constitutive	  aims.	  I	  have	  been	  assuming	  that	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  our	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hypologically	  ought	  to	  do	  as	  ought	  claims	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated26	  agent	  in	  practices	  of	  prospective	  criticism:	  namely,	  practices	  of	  undertaking	  to	  criticize	  agents	  –	  assuming	  that	  they	  are	  suitably	  well-­‐informed	  about	  relevant	  matters	  of	  fact27	  –	  insofar	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  act	  accordingly.	  To	  show	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  hypological	  ought	  may	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands,	  we	  must	  find	  some	  plausible	  specification	  of	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prospective	  criticism	  such	  that	  being	  feasible	  is	  not	  among	  the	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  ought	  claims	  to	  be	  usable	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim.	  What	  might	  this	  look	  like?	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prospective	  criticism	  –	  like	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prescription	  and	  deliberation	  –	  is	  practical:	  to	  get	  the	  agent	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act.	  It	  follows	  relatively	  straightforwardly	  that	  claims	  involving	  the	  hypological	  ought,	  thus	  construed,	  may	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands.	  For	  it	  is	  clearly	  not	  necessary	  that	  one	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  oneself	  to	  perform	  an	  act	  in	  order	  for	  an	  ought	  claim	  to	  be	  usable	  by	  an	  appropriately	  situated	  prospective	  criticizer	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim.	  What	  is	  necessary	  instead	  is	  that	  one	  be	  able	  to	  be	  brought	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  criticism.	  But	  while	  this	  way	  of	  elucidating	  the	  hypological	  ought	  explains	  how	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible	  may	  be	  true,	  it	  cannot	  do	  so	  in	  an	  especially	  satisfying	  way.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  a	  further	  modification	  of	  the	  case	  of	  Selfish	  Bill.	  Suppose	  that	  Bill	  has	  sunk	  to	  such	  depths	  of	  selfishness	  and	  laziness	  that	  he	  cannot	  even	  be	  brought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  criticism.	  I	  take	  it	  that	  there	  is	  no	  temptation	  to	  alter	  our	  verdict	  that	  there	  is	  an	  important	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  true	  that	  Bill	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish,	  and	  that	  denying	  this	  would	  amount	  to	  mistakenly	  letting	  Bill	  off	  the	  hook.	  But	  if	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prospective	  criticism	  is	  to	  get	  the	  agent	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act,	  then	  we	  cannot	  explain	  this	  further	  verdict	  by	  evoking	  the	  hypological	  ought.	  For	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  Bill	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  is	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  undertaking	  to	  criticize	  Bill	  insofar	  as	  fails	  to	  dump	  his	  rubbish	  and,	  hence,	  false	  insofar	  as	  it	  involves	  the	  hypological	  ought.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  if	  we	  are	  to	  recruit	  the	  hypological	  ought	  to	  vindicate	  the	  second	  part	  of	  our	  ambivalence	  in	  a	  fully	  satisfying	  way,	  we	  had	  better	  find	  a	  specification	  of	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prospective	  criticism	  that	  does	  not	  encompass	  getting	  the	  agent	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  evaluative	  practices	  is	  purely	  “classificatory”	  (Nagel	  1971,	  p.	  109).	  But	  it	  is	  not	  plausible	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  our	  hypological	  practices	  is	  purely	  classificatory.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  raising	  this	  issue.	  26	  I	  won’t	  try	  to	  say	  exactly	  what	  it	  takes	  for	  a	  prospective	  criticizer	  to	  be	  “appropriately	  situated.”	  However,	  plausibly	  it	  involves	  being	  informed	  about	  relevant	  matters	  of	  fact	  and	  having	  the	  requisite	  “standing”	  to	  criticize.	  27	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  agents	  are	  sufficiently	  well-­‐informed	  about	  matters	  of	  fact	  that	  bear	  upon	  the	  substantive	  profile	  of	  the	  act	  in	  question.	  While	  I	  will	  generally	  omit	  this	  cumbersome	  qualification	  in	  what	  follows	  for	  ease	  of	  exposition,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  avoid	  a	  serious	  objection	  based	  on	  cases	  of	  blameless	  wrongdoing.	  I	  am	  very	  grateful	  to	  a	  referee	  for	  raising	  this	  objection	  and	  forcing	  me	  to	  clarify	  my	  account	  of	  the	  hypological	  ought	  accordingly.	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perform	  the	  relevant	  act.	  What	  could	  this	  be?	  Here	  is	  a	  natural	  thought.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prospective	  criticism	  is	  simply	  to	  hold	  one	  another	  (and	  ourselves)	  
accountable	  for	  how	  we	  act.	  It	  is	  now	  widely	  accepted	  that	  criticism	  amounts	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  “intangible”	  sanctioning	  mechanism	  that	  operates	  alongside	  the	  kinds	  of	  tangible	  sanctions	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  violations	  of	  important	  parts	  of	  the	  law	  (see	  Brennan	  and	  Pettit	  2004;	  Brennan	  et	  al	  2013,	  ch.	  10).	  At	  least	  for	  well-­‐functioning	  agents,	  criticism	  is	  something	  we	  care	  about.	  Doling	  it	  out	  amounts	  to	  a	  way	  of	  “enforcing”	  or	  “policing”	  compliance	  with	  certain	  norms.	  Just	  as	  the	  prospect	  of	  tangible	  legal	  sanctions	  operates	  to	  make	  us	  accountable	  to	  one	  another	  as	  fellow	  citizens,	  the	  prospect	  of	  intangible	  hypological	  sanctions	  operates	  to	  make	  us	  accountable	  to	  one	  another	  (and	  ourselves)	  as	  fellow	  agents.	  Which	  conditions	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  an	  ought	  claim	  to	  be	  usable	  in	  prospective	  criticism	  to	  hold	  an	  agent	  accountable?	  One	  possible	  condition	  is	  that	  the	  agent	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  registering,	  acknowledging,	  and	  being	  appropriately	  responsive	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  criticism	  (see	  McGeer	  and	  Pettit	  2015).28	  Another	  possible	  condition	  is	  that	  there	  was	  
some	  time	  at	  which	  it	  was	  true	  that	  the	  agent	  could	  have	  taken	  steps	  to	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that,	  now,	  she	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  herself	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act.	  Where	  these	  conditions	  are	  not	  met,	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  not	  fully	  answerable	  for	  her	  conduct	  in	  the	  way	  that	  is	  required	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  her	  properly	  accountable	  for	  her	  failure	  to	  perform	  a	  relevant	  act.	  Perhaps	  these	  conditions	  are	  valid,	  perhaps	  not.	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  either	  way.	  It	  is	  enough	  for	  my	  purposes	  to	  note	  that	  it	  is	  surely	  not	  necessary	  that	  the	  agent	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  herself,	  or	  be	  brought	  (by	  prospective	  criticism,	  or	  prescription,	  or	  whatever),	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act.	  Take	  Selfish	  Bill.	  Bill	  cannot	  bring	  himself,	  or	  be	  brought,	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  Suppose,	  moreover,	  that	  a)	  Bill	  is	  perfectly	  capable	  of	  registering,	  acknowledging,	  and	  being	  appropriately	  responsive	  to	  prospective	  criticism	  insofar	  as	  he	  dumps	  his	  rubbish	  (say,	  by	  undertaking	  to	  compensate	  his	  neighbours	  and	  to	  enrol	  in	  anti-­‐dumping	  classes)	  and	  b)	  Bill	  could	  easily	  have	  taken	  steps	  to	  make	  it	  the	  case	  that,	  now,	  he	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  herself,	  and	  be	  brought,	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish.	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  should	  we	  say	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  Bill	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  is	  unfit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prospective	  criticism	  because	  using	  it	  in	  that	  way	  would	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  holding	  him	  accountable?	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  holding	  Bill	  accountable	  requires	  precisely	  holding	  firm	  and	  undertaking	  to	  criticise	  him	  regardless	  of	  his	  inability	  to	  bring	  himself,	  or	  be	  brought,	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  One	  important	  way	  of	  being	  appropriately	  responsive	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  legitimate	  criticism	  is	  to	  avoid	  the	  prospect	  eventuating	  by	  undertaking	  to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  act.	  Other	  ways	  may	  include	  undertaking	  to	  acknowledge	  wrongdoing,	  to	  apologise,	  to	  have	  or	  express	  certain	  reactive	  attitudes,	  to	  mitigate	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  one’s	  conduct,	  to	  compensate	  those	  adversely	  affected,	  and	  taking	  steps	  to	  alter	  what	  we	  can	  bring	  ourselves	  to	  do	  in	  the	  future.	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rubbish.	  While	  using	  the	  claim	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish	  to	  undertake	  to	  criticize	  him	  has	  no	  prospect	  of	  getting	  him	  to	  refrain	  from	  dumping	  his	  rubbish,	  anything	  less	  would	  amount	  to	  a	  failure	  to	  hold	  him	  to	  account.29	  If	  I	  am	  right	  that	  the	  constitutive	  aim	  of	  prospective	  criticism	  is	  to	  hold	  one	  another	  (and	  ourselves)	  accountable,	  then	  feasibility	  is	  not	  among	  the	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  an	  ought	  claim	  to	  be	  usable	  in	  prospective	  criticism	  to	  achieve	  its	  constitutive	  aim	  and,	  hence,	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prospective	  criticism.	  Claims	  involving	  the	  hypological	  ought,	  thus	  construed,	  may	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  demanding	  that	  agents	  perform	  acts	  they	  cannot	  bring	  themselves	  to	  perform.	  Moreover,	  claims	  involving	  the	  hypological	  claim	  may	  also	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  demanding	  that	  agents	  perform	  acts	  they	  cannot	  be	  brought	  to	  perform	  (by	  prospective	  criticism,	  or	  prescription,	  or	  whatever).	  So	  we	  have	  found	  an	  ought	  –	  the	  hypological	  ought	  –	  that	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  constrained	  by	  what	  is	  feasible.	  But	  is	  the	  hypological	  ought	  the	  right	  ought	  to	  vindicate	  the	  second	  part	  of	  our	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  certain	  normative	  claims	  that	  make	  infeasible	  demands?	  Consider	  again	  the	  claim	  that	  	  	  (1) The	  Pecunians	  ought	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation.	  	  Can	  recourse	  to	  the	  hypological	  ought	  vindicate	  our	  sense	  that	  (1)	  is	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible,	  that	  the	  Pecunians	  would	  do	  wrong	  insofar	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation,	  and	  that	  insisting	  otherwise	  would	  amount	  to	  mistakenly	  letting	  them	  off	  the	  hook?	  First,	  recourse	  to	  the	  hypological	  ought	  can	  obviously	  explain	  why	  (1)	  might	  be	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  demanding	  the	  infeasible.	  Suppose	  we	  interpret	  the	  ought	  in	  (1)	  as	  involving	  the	  hypological	  ought.	  Given	  the	  account	  of	  the	  hypological	  ought	  that	  I	  have	  offered,	  this	  means	  that	  (1)	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prospective	  criticism.	  And	  (1)	  may	  be	  perfectly	  fit	  to	  be	  used	  in	  prospectively	  criticizing	  the	  Pecunians	  insofar	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  cannot	  bring	  themselves	  to	  do	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation.	  Second,	  such	  an	  interpretation	  of	  (1)	  also	  nicely	  captures	  our	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  with	  the	  Pecunians’	  conduct	  insofar	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation,	  not	  merely	  something	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  I	  am	  not,	  of	  course,	  denying	  that	  holding	  an	  agent	  to	  account	  often	  has	  an	  important	  practical	  dimension.	  Indeed,	  in	  what	  we	  might	  call	  favorable	  cases	  –	  where	  the	  agent	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  herself,	  or	  be	  brought,	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  –	  holding	  her	  to	  account	  may	  involve	  precisely	  aiming	  to	  get	  her	  to	  avoid	  the	  prospect	  eventuating	  by	  performing	  the	  act.	  In	  favorable	  cases,	  this	  may	  well	  be	  the	  uniquely	  appropriate	  way	  for	  the	  agent	  to	  be	  responsive.	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regrettable,	  or	  something	  conditionally	  wrong,	  or	  something	  wrong	  with	  their	  character.	  Their	  conduct	  is	  wrong	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  criticizable.	  Third,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  sense	  in	  which	  denying	  (1)	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  is	  infeasible	  for	  the	  Pecunians	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  position	  of	  the	  poor	  by	  progressive	  taxation	  would	  be	  to	  treat	  them	  with	  undue	  lenience.	  Indeed,	  talk	  of	  “mistakenly	  letting	  agents	  off	  the	  hook”	  suggests	  precisely	  refraining	  from	  prospective	  criticism	  when	  prospective	  criticism	  is	  warranted,	  thereby	  mistakenly	  failing	  to	  hold	  them	  to	  account.	  	  VII.	  CONCLUSION	  Many	  of	  us	  feel	  internally	  conflicted	  in	  the	  face	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible.	  This	  might	  be	  because	  we	  are	  making	  a	  mistake.	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  article	  has	  been	  to	  explore	  in	  detail	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  that	  our	  ambivalent	  reactions	  are	  entirely	  consistent	  and	  appropriate.	  Rather	  than	  some	  single	  privileged	  ought	  such	  that	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  is	  either	  true	  or	  false,	  there	  are	  simply	  different	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts	  that	  our	  ambivalent	  reactions	  may	  be	  tracking.	  I	  have	  offered	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  these	  different	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts	  in	  general,	  considered	  and	  rejected	  one	  appealing	  existing	  account	  concerning	  the	  particular	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts	  that	  are	  at	  play,	  and	  proposed	  a	  different	  account.	  Let	  me	  close	  by	  saying	  something	  very	  briefly	  about	  three	  assumptions	  that	  have	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  my	  argument.	  First,	  I	  have	  assumed	  a	  stipulative	  definition	  of	  feasibility	  such	  that	  by	  “feasible”	  we	  mean	  specifically	  what	  we	  can	  bring	  ourselves	  to	  do.	  Suppose	  you	  reject	  this	  assumption.	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  what	  I	  have	  said	  is	  devoid	  of	  interest?	  No.	  Both	  the	  general	  framework	  for	  understanding	  different	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts	  and	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  particular	  oughts	  (such	  as	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  and	  the	  hypological	  ought)	  that	  I	  have	  offered	  might	  very	  well	  be	  put	  to	  work	  to	  interrogate	  whether	  “ought”	  implies	  “feasible”	  in	  some	  other	  sense.	  Second,	  I	  have	  assumed	  that,	  like	  me,	  you	  are	  ambivalent	  about	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible.	  Suppose	  you	  are	  not	  ambivalent.	  Rather,	  such	  claims	  strike	  you	  either	  as	  straightforwardly	  false	  on	  account	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands,	  or	  as	  straightforwardly	  true	  in	  spite	  of	  making	  infeasible	  demands.	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  what	  I	  have	  said	  is	  irrelevant?	  No.	  It	  might	  be	  that	  you	  have	  been	  implicitly	  (or	  even	  explicitly)	  privileging	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  relevant	  normative	  claims	  in	  which	  the	  relevant	  ought	  is	  the	  deliberative	  ought	  or	  the	  hypological	  ought.	  In	  that	  case,	  I	  have	  provided	  you	  with	  a	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  interpretation	  that	  you	  take	  to	  be	  privileged.	  Moreover,	  there	  is,	  as	  it	  were,	  an	  interpersonal	  analogue	  of	  our	  problem	  of	  explaining	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible:	  namely,	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  disagreement	  among	  theorists	  who	  are	  non-­‐
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demand	  the	  infeasible.	  The	  account	  I	  have	  presented	  here	  might	  be	  used	  to	  show	  that	  neither	  side	  need	  be	  making	  an	  error.	  Third,	  I	  have	  assumed	  a	  particular	  framework	  that	  holds	  that	  there	  is	  a	  plurality	  of	  core	  practice-­‐serving	  oughts	  and	  that	  they	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  This	  framework	  is	  by	  no	  means	  uncontroversial.	  I	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  argue	  for	  it	  directly.	  Obviously,	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  a	  formidable	  task.	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  paper	  rests	  on	  a	  framework	  for	  which	  we	  have	  provided	  no	  support?	  No.	  The	  conclusion	  of	  the	  paper	  itself	  provides	  some	  support	  for	  the	  framework.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  framework	  affords	  us	  a	  compelling	  vindicating	  explanation	  of	  our	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  face	  of	  normative	  claims	  that	  demand	  the	  infeasible	  is	  itself	  some	  evidence	  that	  it	  is	  true.	  	  References	  Aristotle.	  1970.	  Physics,	  trans.	  W.	  Charlton.	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press.	  Arpaly,	  Nomy.	  2000.	  “On	  Acting	  Rationally	  Against	  One’s	  Best	  Judgment,”	  Ethics,	  110,	  488-­‐513.	  Austin,	  J.	  L.	  1956.	  “Ifs	  and	  Cans,”	  Proceedings	  of	  The	  British	  Academy,	  42,	  107-­‐132.	  Blake,	  Michael.	  2001.	  “Distributive	  Justice,	  State	  Coercion,	  and	  Autonomy,”	  Philosophy	  &	  
Public	  Affairs,	  30,	  257-­‐96.	  Brennan,	  Geoffrey,	  Lina	  Eriksson,	  Robert	  E.	  Goodin,	  and	  Nicholas	  Southwood.	  2013.	  
Explaining	  Norms.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Brennan,	  Geoffrey	  and	  Philip	  Pettit.	  2004.	  The	  Economy	  of	  Esteem.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Brennan,	  Geoffrey	  and	  Philip	  Pettit.	  2005.	  “The	  Feasibility	  Issue,”	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  
Contemporary	  Philosophy,	  ed.	  F.	  Jackson	  and	  M.	  Smith.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Brennan,	   Geoffrey	   and	   Nicholas	   Southwood.	   2007.	   “Feasibility	   in	   Action	   and	   Attitude,”	  
Hommage	   à	   Wlodek:	   Philosophical	   Papers	   Dedicated	   to	   Wlodek	   Rabinowicz,	   ed.	   T.	  Rønnow-­‐Rasmussen,	  B.	  Petersson,	  J	  Jonefsson	  and	  D	  Egonsson,	  1-­‐25.	  	  Chuard,	  Philippe	  and	  Nicholas	  Southwood.	  2009.	  “Epistemic	  norms	  without	  voluntary	  control,”	  Nous,	  599-­‐632.	  Cohen,	  G.	  A.	  2003.	  “Facts	  and	  Principles,”	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs,	  31,	  211-­‐45.	  Cohen,	  G.	  A.	  2008.	  Rescuing	  Justice	  and	  Equality.	  Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Estlund,	  David.	  2007.	  Democratic	  Authority:	  a	  Philosophical	  Framework.	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  Estlund,	  David.	  2011.	  “Human	  Nature	  and	  the	  Limits	  (If	  Any)	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,”	  
Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs,	  39,	  207-­‐37.	  Estlund,	  David.	  2014.	  “Utopophobia,”	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs,	  42,	  113-­‐34.	  Gheaus,	  Anca.	  2013.	  “The	  Feasibility	  Constraint	  on	  the	  Concept	  of	  Justice,”	  Philosophical	  
Quarterly,	  63,	  445-­‐64.	  
	   30	  
Gibbard,	  Alan.	  1990.	  Wise	  Choices,	  Apt	  Feelings:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Normative	  Judgment.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Gilabert,	  Pablo.	  2009.	  “The	  Feasibility	  of	  Basic	  Socioeconomic	  Human	  Rights:	  a	  Conceptual	  Exploration,”	  Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  59,	  659-­‐81.	  Gilabert,	  Pablo.	  2011.	  “Feasibility	  and	  Socialism,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  19,	  52-­‐63.	  Gilabert,	  Pablo	  and	  Holly	  Lawford-­‐Smith.	  2012.	  “Political	  Feasibility:	  A	  Conceptual	  Exploration,”	  Political	  Studies,	  60,	  809-­‐25.	  Goodin,	  Robert	  E.	  and	  Philip	  Pettit.	  1995.	  “Introduction,”	  A	  Companion	  to	  Contemporary	  
Political	  Philosophy.	  Oxford:	  Blackwell.	  Hamlin,	  Alan	  and	  Zofia	  Stemplowska.	  2012.	  “Theory,	  Ideal	  Theory,	  and	  the	  Theory	  of	  Ideals,”	  
Political	  Studies	  Review,	  10,	  48-­‐62.	  Hayek,	  Friedrich.	  1935.	  Collectivist	  Economic	  Planning:	  Critical	  Studies	  on	  the	  Possibilities	  of	  
Socialism.	  London:	  Routledge.	  Hieronymi,	  Pamela.	  2009.	  “The	  Will	  as	  Reason,”	  Philosophical	  Perspectives,	  23,	  201-­‐220.	  Hieronymi,	  Pamela.	  2011.	  “Reasons	  for	  Action,”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  Society,	  111,	  407-­‐27.	  Jackson,	  Frank.	  1991.	  “Decision-­‐Theoretic	  Consequentialism	  and	  the	  Nearest	  and	  Dearest	  Objection,”	  Ethics,	  101,	  461-­‐482.	  Jackson,	  Frank	  and	  Robert	  Pargetter.	  1986.	  “Oughts,	  Options,	  and	  Actualism,”	  The	  
Philosophical	  Review,	  95,	  233-­‐55.	  Kamminga,	  Menno.	  2006.	  “Why	  Global	  Distributive	  Justice	  Cannot	  Work,”	  Acta	  Politica,	  41,	  21-­‐40.	  Kant,	  Immanuel.	  1998.	  Groundwork	  of	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  trans.	  Mary	  Gregor.	  Cambridge,	  UK;	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Katsafanas,	  Paul.	  2013.	  Agency	  and	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Ethics:	  Nietzchean	  Constitutivism.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Kavka,	  Gregory.	  1983.	  “The	  Toxin	  Puzzle,”	  Analysis,	  43,	  33-­‐6.	  Kiesewetter,	  Benjamin.	  Forthcoming.	  The	  Normativity	  of	  Rationality.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Kolodny,	  Niko.	  2005.	  “Why	  Be	  Rational?”	  Mind,	  114,	  509-­‐63.	  Korsgaard,	  Christine.	  1996.	  The	  Sources	  of	  Normativity.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Korsgaard,	  Christine.	  2009.	  Self	  Constitution:	  Agency,	  Identity,	  and	  Integrity.	  Oxford;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Kratzer,	  Angelika.	  1977.	  “What	  ‘Must’	  and	  ‘Can’	  Must	  and	  Can	  Mean,”	  Linguistics	  and	  
Philosophy,	  1,	  337-­‐355.	  
	   31	  
Lawford-­‐Smith,	  Holly.	  2012.	  “The	  Feasibility	  of	  Collectives’	  Action,”	  The	  Australasian	  Journal	  
of	  Philosophy,	  90,	  453-­‐67.	  Lawford-­‐Smith,	  Holly.	  2013.	  “Understanding	  Political	  Feasibility,”	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Philosophy,	  21,	  243-­‐59.	  Lehrer,	  Keith,	  1968.	  “Cans	  without	  Ifs,”	  Analysis,	  29,	  29–32.	  McGeer,	  Victoria	  and	  Philip	  Pettit.	  2015.	  “The	  Hard	  Problem	  of	  Agency	  and	  Responsibility,”	  
Oxford	  Studies	  in	  Agency	  and	  Responsibility,	  3,	  160-­‐88.	  McHugh,	  Conor	  and	  Jonathan	  Way.	  Forthcoming.	  “Fittingness	  First,”	  Ethics.	  McPherson,	  Tristram.	  Ms.	  “The	  Truth	  in	  Constitutivism,”	  unpublished	  paper.	  Maier,	   John.	  2014.	  “Abilities,”	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  ed.	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta,	  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/abilities/>.	  Mason,	  Andrew.	  2004.	  “Just	  Constraints,”	  British	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science,	  34,	  251-­‐68.	  Miller,	  David.	  1976.	  Social	  Justice.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Miller,	  David.	  2005.	  “Against	  Global	  Egalitarianism,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Ethics,	  9,	  55-­‐79.	  Miller,	   David.	   2013.	   Justice	   for	   Earthlings:	   Essays	   in	   Political	   Philosophy.	   Cambridge,	   UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Moore,	  G.	  E.	  1912.	  Ethics.	  London:	  Williams	  and	  Norgate.	  Nagel,	  Thomas.	  1971.	  The	  Possibility	  of	  Altruism.	  Oxford:	  Clarendon.	  Nagel,	  Thomas.	  1991.	  Equality	  and	  Partiality.	  Oxford	  and	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Nove,	  Alec.	  1991.	  The	  Economics	  of	  Feasible	  Socialism	  Revisited.	  London:	  Harper	  Collins.	  Owens,	  David.	  2011.	  ‘Deliberation	  and	  the	  First	  Person’.	  In	  Self	  Knowledge,	  ed.	  Anthony	  Hatzimoysis.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  pp.	  261-­‐77.	  Parfit,	  Derek.	  2011.	  On	  What	  Matters.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Pettit,	  Philip.	  2012.	  On	  the	  People’s	  Terms.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Portmore,	  Douglas.	  2012.	  Commonsense	  Consequentialism:	  Wherein	  Morality	  Meets	  
Rationality.	  Oxford;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Raikka,	  Juha.	  1998.	  “The	  Feasibility	  Condition	  in	  Political	  Theory,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Philosophy,	  1,	  27-­‐40.	  Rawls,	  John.	  1971.	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap	  Press.	  Ross,	  W.	  D.	  1930.	  The	  Right	  and	  the	  Good.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Scanlon,	  T.M.	  1998.	  What	  We	  Owe	  To	  Each	  Other.	  Cambridge,	  M.A.:	  Bellknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Schroeder,	  Mark.	  2009.	  “Means-­‐Ends	  Coherence,	  Stringency,	  and	  Subjective	  Reasons,”	  
Philosophical	  Studies,	  143,	  223-­‐48.	  Schroeder,	  Mark.	  2011.	  “Ought,	  Agents,	  and	  Actions,”	  The	  Philosophical	  Review,	  120,	  1-­‐41.	  Sinnott-­‐Armstrong,	  Walter.	  1984.	  “‘Ought’”	  conversationally	  implies	  ‘can,’”	  Philosophical	  
Review,	  93,	  249-­‐61.	  Smith,	  Michael.	  1994.	  The	  Moral	  Problem.	  Oxford:	  Blackwell.	  
	   32	  
Smith,	  Michael.	  1995.	  “Internal	  Reasons,”	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research,	  55,	  110-­‐31.	  Southwood,	  Nicholas.	  2010.	  Contractualism	  and	  the	  Foundations	  of	  Morality.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Southwood,	  Nicholas.	  2015.	  “The	  Relevance	  of	  Human	  Nature,”	   Journal	  of	  Ethics	  and	  Social	  
Philosophy,	  9,	  1-­‐8.	  Southwood.	  Nicholas.	  2016.	  “‘The	  Thing	  to	  Do’	  Implies	  ‘Can,’”	  Noûs,	  50,	  61-­‐72.	  Southwood,	  Nicholas.	  Forthcoming.	  “Constructivism	  About	  Reasons,”	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  
of	  Reasons	  and	  Normativity,	  ed.	  D.	  Star.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Southwood,	  Nicholas	  and	  Lina	  Eriksson.	  2011.	  “Norms	  and	  Conventions,”	  Philosophical	  
Explorations,	  14,	  195-­‐217.	  Southwood,	   Nicholas	   and	  David	  Wiens.	   Forthcoming.	   “‘Actual’	   Does	  Not	   Imply	   ‘Feasible,’”	  
Philosophical	  Studies.	  Stocker,	  Michael.	  1971.	  “‘Ought’	  and	  ‘can,’”	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  49,	  303-­‐16.	  Swift,	  Adam.	  2008.	  “The	  Value	  of	  Philosophy	  in	  Nonideal	  Circumstances,”	  Social	  Theory	  and	  
Practice,	  34,	  363-­‐87.	  Velleman,	  David.	  2000.	  The	  Possibility	  of	  Practical	  Reason.	  Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press.	  Vihvelin,	  Kadri.	  2004.	  “Free	  Will	  Demystified:	  A	  Dispositional	  Account,”	  Philosophical	  Topics,	  32,	  427-­‐50	  Wallace,	  R.	  Jay.	  2001.	  ‘Normativity,	  Commitment,	  and	  Instrumental	  Reason’,	  Philosophers’	  
Imprint,	  1/3	  (December).	  Wallace,	   R.	   Jay.	   2014.	   “Practical	   Reason,”	   Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	   available	   at	  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-­‐reason.	  Watson,	  Gary.	   1982.	   “Free	  Agency,”	  Free	  Will,	   ed.	   Gary	  Watson.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Wiens,	  David.	  2013.	  “The	  Demands	  of	  Justice,	  Feasible	  Alternatives,	  and	  the	  Need	  for	  Causal	  Analysis,”	  Ethical	  Theory	  and	  Moral	  Practice	  16,	  325-­‐338.	  Wiens,	  David.	  2014.	  “‘Going	  Evaluative’	  to	  Save	  Justice	  from	  Feasibility:	  A	  Pyrrhic	  Victory,”	  
Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  64,	  301-­‐07.	  Wiens,	  David.	  2015.	  “Political	  Ideals	  and	  the	  Feasibility	  Frontier,”	  Economics	  and	  Philosophy.	  Wolf,	  Susan.	  1990.	  Freedom	  Within	  Reason.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Zimmerman,	  Michael	  J.	  2006.	  “Moral	  Luck:	  A	  Partial	  Map,”	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  36,	  585-­‐608.	  
